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Korematsu v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States · 1944 · Constitutional Law
equal protectionstrict scrutinyJapanese internmentracenational securitystrict scrutinyracial classificationswar powers

Facts

Petitioner knowingly remained in San Leandro, California, a designated military area, after Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 directed that all persons of Japanese ancestry be excluded from that area after May 9, 1942. He was prosecuted under the Act of March 21, 1942, which made it a misdemeanor to remain in a military area contrary to restrictions imposed under presidential and military authority. The exclusion order was part of a series of wartime measures issued under Executive Order No. 9066 and aimed at protection against espionage and sabotage. No question was raised as to petitioner's loyalty to the United States.

Issue

Whether Congress and the Executive, acting under the war power, could constitutionally exclude persons of Japanese ancestry from a West Coast military area through Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, and whether petitioner's conviction for violating that exclusion order was valid.

Rule

All legal restrictions curtailing the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect and courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Such restrictions are not necessarily unconstitutional: pressing public necessity may sometimes justify them, though racial antagonism never can. In wartime, exclusion from a threatened area may fall within the war power when military authorities have grounds to conclude it is necessary to prevent espionage and sabotage and that disloyal persons cannot be promptly isolated from loyal ones.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
After a declared war begins, Congress authorizes military commanders to regulate access to a naval-industrial corridor near Seattle, Washington. The commanding general orders all persons of Ardan ancestry excluded from the corridor, citing intelligence that enemy agents may attempt sabotage there and that disloyal members of the Ardan-ancestry population cannot be promptly identified individually; Maya Ito, a U.S. citizen of Ardan ancestry, knowingly remains and is prosecuted only for violating the exclusion order.

Under the majority's approach, which is the strongest basis for upholding Maya's conviction?

Explanation. The majority said racial restrictions are immediately suspect and must receive the most rigid scrutiny, but are not per se invalid. They may be upheld if justified by pressing public necessity rather than racial antagonism, especially where exclusion from a threatened area bears a definite and close relationship to preventing espionage and sabotage and the military had grounds to conclude disloyal persons could not be quickly identified and isolated.