Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority

United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts · Torts

TortsSection 1983Fair Housing ActDisparate impactSection 8 housing42 U.S.C. § 1983Blessing v. FreestoneSection 8

Facts

Eight suburban Massachusetts PHAs administering Section 8 vouchers used application procedures that required applicants to request applications during a two-day period and several PHAs gave waiting-list priority to local residents. The PHA communities were predominantly white and had relatively low poverty, while the named plaintiffs were extremely low-income women of color living in Randolph and Brockton and were not residents of any defendant PHA community. Plaintiffs presented evidence that the residency preferences favored applicants from whiter communities and that the application logistics and notice of residency preferences deterred or burdened nonresident applicants. Some PHAs also lacked records sufficient to assess the racial effects of their selection systems.

Issue

Whether plaintiffs could enforce the relevant housing statutes, regulations, and executive orders through § 1983, and whether the PHAs' residency preferences and application procedures violated the 75% Rule, the Fair Housing Act's disparate-impact prohibition, and the duty to affirmatively further fair housing. More specifically, the court had to decide whether Congress's authorization of local preferences under QHWRA allowed these residency preferences despite their racial effects.

Rule

A federal housing provision is enforceable under § 1983 when it satisfies the Blessing criteria: Congress intended the provision to benefit the plaintiff, the asserted right is not so vague and amorphous as to be beyond judicial competence, and the provision unambiguously imposes a binding obligation. Under the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie disparate-impact claim by showing that a housing practice has an unjustified disparate racial impact; a residency preference is not justified merely because local preferences are generally permitted, but only if it is supported by legitimate and substantial reasons consistent with the broader statutory and civil-rights framework and no less discriminatory alternative is available. PHAs also must affirmatively further fair housing by examining proposed programs, identifying impediments to fair housing choice, addressing them reasonably, working with local jurisdictions where necessary, and maintaining records of those analyses and actions.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

The Cedar Glen Housing Board in Ohio administers federal housing vouchers. A group of applicants with incomes below 30% of area median income sues under § 1983, alleging the Board's annual admissions plan will allocate fewer than 75% of newly available vouchers to extremely low-income families, contrary to a federal housing statute that states "not less than 75 percent shall be" such families.

Is the applicants' § 1983 claim most likely viable?

Explanation. The claim is viable under the majority's Blessing analysis. A provision is enforceable under § 1983 when Congress intended to benefit the plaintiff, the asserted right is not vague or amorphous, and the provision unambiguously imposes a binding obligation. A 75% targeting command directed to admissions of extremely low-income families satisfies all three: it benefits that class, is concrete enough for courts to apply, and is phrased in mandatory terms ('shall'). (Derived from Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority (n.d.).)