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Lassiter v. Department of Social Services

Supreme Court of the United States · 1981 · Civil Procedure

Civil ProcedureConstitutional LawDue ProcessRight to CounselTermination of Parental RightsFourteenth AmendmentDue Process Clauseappointed counsel

Facts

After Lassiter's son had previously been adjudicated neglected and placed in the custody of the Durham County Department of Social Services, the Department petitioned in 1978 to terminate her parental rights, alleging that she had had no contact with the child since December 1975 and had willfully left him in foster care for more than two years without making progress or responding to the Department's efforts. Lassiter, who was then imprisoned, was served with the petition and notice of hearing, was brought from prison to the hearing, and was not appointed counsel because she did not aver indigency and the court declined to postpone the matter to let her seek legal assistance. At the hearing, the Department presented a social worker, Lassiter cross-examined and testified on her own behalf, and her mother also testified. The trial court found that Lassiter had not contacted the Department about the child since December 1975, had not expressed concern for his welfare, and had made no efforts to plan for his future, and it terminated her parental rights.

Issue

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to appoint counsel for an indigent parent whenever the state seeks to terminate that parent's parental rights? More specifically, did due process require appointment of counsel for Lassiter in this termination proceeding?

Rule

An indigent litigant is presumed to have a right to appointed counsel only when, if unsuccessful, the litigant may be deprived of physical liberty. In parental-termination proceedings, whether due process requires appointed counsel is decided case by case by balancing the Mathews v. Eldridge factors—the parent's private interests, the government's interests, and the risk of erroneous decision from the procedures used—against that presumption; the trial court makes the determination in the first instance, subject to appellate review.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Phoenix, Arizona, a county family-services office petitions to terminate indigent parent Elena Ruiz's parental rights. The hearing will feature dueling psychologists, disputed medical records, and allegations that Elena fabricated injuries to obtain benefits, conduct that could expose her to criminal charges. Elena asks the trial judge to appoint counsel.

Under the governing due process standard, how should the judge rule?

Explanation. The majority held there is no categorical constitutional right to appointed counsel in every termination case. Instead, the court must weigh the Mathews factors—the parent's interest, the government's interests, and the risk of error—against the presumption that appointed counsel is ordinarily required only when loss of physical liberty is at stake. The majority specifically noted that expert testimony, complexity, and dangers of criminal liability are circumstances that may make the risk of error sufficiently high to require counsel in a particular termination proceeding.