Lewis v. McGraw
Facts
American Express first proposed a business combination at $34 per share and later submitted a $40 per share proposal that would become effective only if McGraw-Hill's management agreed not to oppose it. McGraw-Hill's board rejected both proposals and publicly described the initial proposal as "reckless," "illegal," and "improper," while also making statements attacking American Express and the adequacy of the proposed price. Plaintiffs alleged those statements were false and claimed that truthful disclosure would have caused the American Express proposal to be consummated. Plaintiffs conceded, however, that no tender offer was ever actually made to McGraw-Hill shareholders and that no shareholder ever had the opportunity to tender shares.
Issue
May shareholders maintain a damages action under § 14(e) of the Williams Act for alleged misstatements made in connection with a proposed tender offer when no tender offer was ever made to them? More specifically, can reliance be presumed where shareholders never had any opportunity to tender their shares?
Rule
Section 14(e) is aimed at protecting investors confronted with a tender offer and ensuring they do not have to respond without adequate information. A cause of action for damages under § 14(e) requires misrepresentation and shareholder reliance; reliance may be presumed only where reliance is possible and it is logical to do so, not where no tender offer was ever made and reliance was impossible.
See the holding & full analysis
Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.
- The court's holding and reasoning
- Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
- 10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case
Test yourself
Are the shareholders most likely to prevail on their § 14(e) damages claim?