Locke v. Warner Bros., Inc.
Facts
Locke entered into a written agreement with Warner under which she would receive guaranteed compensation for a non-exclusive first-look development deal and a pay-or-play directing deal. Warner paid the guaranteed compensation and provided an office and assistant, but it did not develop any of Locke's proposed projects or hire her to direct any films. Locke produced evidence that Warner executives said the studio was not going to work with her and that the arrangement was 'Clint's deal.' Locke alleged Warner never intended to consider her projects in good faith and entered the agreement only to accommodate Eastwood.
Issue
Whether triable issues of material fact existed as to Warner's alleged breach of contract by refusing in bad faith to consider Locke's proposals on their merits, and as to Warner's alleged fraud in entering the agreement without intending to perform. Also, whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment on Locke's sex-discrimination-based claims.
Rule
When a contract gives one party discretionary power affecting the other's rights, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that discretion to be exercised honestly and in good faith. In contracts involving subjective judgment or taste, the promisor's dissatisfaction is not reviewable for reasonableness, but it must be bona fide; a party may not categorically refuse to consider performance while pretending to exercise discretion. The implied covenant cannot prohibit conduct expressly authorized by the contract. Fraudulent intent at contract formation may be proved by circumstantial evidence, including evidence of an absolute unwillingness to perform or a failure even to attempt performance.
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If Nina sues for breach of contract, which is the strongest argument for denying Blue Mesa's motion for summary judgment?