Luthi v. Evans

Kansas Supreme Court · Property

PropertyRecordingNoticeOil and Gas LeasesMother Hubbard clauseconstructive noticeactual noticerecording acts

Facts

Grace V. Owens owned interests in several oil and gas leases in Coffey County, including a working interest in the Kufahl lease. In 1971, she assigned to International Tours, Inc. certain specifically listed leases and also, by a general clause, all of her interests in all oil and gas leases in Coffey County, whether specifically enumerated or not; the Kufahl lease was not specifically described. That assignment was recorded, but the general clause did not state the lessor and lessee names, lease date, legal description, or recording data for the Kufahl lease. In 1975, Owens separately assigned her Kufahl lease interest to J.R. Burris, who checked the records and obtained an abstract that did not reveal Tours's prior claim, and Burris had no actual knowledge of it.

Issue

Does recording an instrument that uses a general 'Mother Hubbard' clause to describe property conveyed constitute constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser for value without actual notice? More specifically, did the recorded Owens-to-Tours assignment give Burris constructive notice of Tours's claim to the Kufahl lease interest?

Rule

A conveyance using a general 'Mother Hubbard' description is valid and effective between the parties and also binds a subsequent purchaser with actual notice. But to impart constructive notice under the recording statutes, a recorded instrument must describe the land conveyed with sufficient specificity so that the specific property can be identified, either from the instrument itself or by specific reference to other recorded instruments.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Wichita, Nora Kim owned several oil-and-gas lease interests in Reno County. She signed and recorded an assignment to Prairie Lantern Energy, LLC conveying seven specifically listed leases and also 'all other oil-and-gas lease interests I own anywhere in Reno County,' but the document gave no lessor or lessee names, lease dates, legal descriptions, or recording data for an additional lease on which she also held a working interest. Three years later, Nora separately assigned that additional lease to Devin Cross, who paid value, searched the county records, and had no actual knowledge of the earlier assignment.

Who has the better claim to the additional lease interest?

Explanation. A general county-wide Mother Hubbard clause can validly transfer the interest between the original parties, but it does not impart constructive notice to a later purchaser unless the recorded instrument identifies the specific property or furnishes the means of identification within the instrument itself or by specific reference to other recorded instruments. Because Devin paid value, lacked actual notice, and the recorded document did not specifically identify the additional lease, the later assignment prevails. (Derived from Luthi v. Evans (n.d.).)