Mahlandt v. Wild Candid Survival Research Center, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · Evidence

588 F.2d 626 (1978)

Updated July 19, 2026

EvidenceAdmissions by party-opponentHearsayFRE 801(d)(2)(A)FRE 801(d)(2)(C)FRE 801(d)(2)(D)FRE 403FRE 805

Facts

After a child was injured near a fenced enclosure containing Sophie, a wolf kept by Kenneth Poos at his home while serving as Director of Education for the corporate defendant, no witness actually saw Sophie bite the child. Within an hour of arriving home, Poos left a note for the corporation's president stating, "Sophie bit a child that came in our back yard," and later told him that "Sophie had bit a child that day." At a later board meeting, minutes reflected discussion of "the incident of Sophie biting the child." The trial court excluded all three items because Poos lacked personal knowledge and the statements were thought to be hearsay and unreliable.

Issue

Whether Poos's note and oral statement were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) against Poos and against the corporation despite Poos's lack of personal knowledge, and whether the corporate board minutes were admissible against the corporation or Poos. The court also considered whether Rule 403 nonetheless justified exclusion.

Rule

A declarant's personal knowledge is not an implied prerequisite to admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or 801(d)(2)(D). A party's own statement is admissible against that party, and an employee's statement is admissible against the employer if it concerns a matter within the scope of the employment and is made during the employment relationship, including "in-house" statements. Corporate board minutes may qualify under Rule 801(d)(2)(C) against the corporation when the directors had authority to include such conclusions, but they are not admissible against a non-attending, non-participating employee absent a qualifying 801(d)(2) relationship; Rule 403 may still support exclusion where probative value is low and admissibility is limited.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Portland, Oregon, Lena Ortiz sued Mason Vale after she was injured in his backyard by an exotic bird he kept there. About thirty minutes after returning home, Mason texted his neighbor, "My bird clawed Lena," even though no one saw the contact and Mason arrived only after the incident ended.

If Lena offers Mason's text against Mason, how should the court rule?

Explanation. The statement is admissible against Mason as his own statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). The majority rejected any implied personal-knowledge requirement for admissions under Rule 801(d)(2), and it likewise rejected the argument that conclusionary content alone makes such a statement inadmissible. (Derived from Mahlandt v. Wild Candid Survival Research Center, Inc. (n.d.).)