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Mahoney v. Mahoney

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department · 2021 · Property
PropertyDivorceEquitable DistributionMaintenanceChild SupportCounsel FeesDomestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)(c)(3)

Facts

The parties were married in 1994 and had two children born in 1997 and 1999. The divorce action was commenced in May 2017, and after an April 2018 nonjury trial the Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff maintenance for eight years, child support for the younger unemancipated child, equitably distributed marital property, and awarded her $35,000 in counsel fees. The plaintiff argued on appeal that the maintenance and child support awards were too low, that a particular savings account should have been distributed rather than reserved for college expenses, and that she should have received more counsel fees. The record included trial testimony supporting the conclusion that the savings account was intended for the children's college expenses.

Issue

Whether the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in setting maintenance and child support, in directing that a savings account be used for the children's college expenses rather than equitably distributed, and in awarding only $35,000 in counsel fees. Also at issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a reallocation of certain marital assets previously divided equally to pay counsel fees during the action.

Rule

In a post-2016 matrimonial action where the payor's income exceeds the statutory maintenance cap, the court must calculate guideline maintenance under Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)(c) and then decide whether to award additional maintenance on income above the cap by considering the factors in § 236(B)(6)(e)(1) and stating the factors considered. The purpose of maintenance is to give the recipient spouse economic independence for a period sufficient to become self-supporting, and the amount and duration are committed to the trial court's sound discretion based on the unique facts of the case. A court may decline to calculate child support on combined parental income above the statutory cap if it sufficiently articulates its reasons and the record supports the determination. In equitable distribution, the trial court has broad discretion, and after a nonjury trial its credibility findings and assessment of evidence are given great weight on appeal. Under Domestic Relations Law § 237(a), there is a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees should be awarded to the less monied spouse, though the amount is left to judicial discretion.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In a divorce action filed in Brooklyn in 2019, Evan Mercer earns $420,000 a year and Dana Mercer earns $38,000. After trial, the judge calculates maintenance only on the first portion of Evan's income up to the statutory cap, then states that no additional maintenance will be awarded on the excess income after considering the parties' ages, health, earning capacities, and marital standard of living.

If Dana appeals solely on the ground that the court was required to apply the maintenance formula to Evan's full income, how should the appellate court rule?

Explanation. The controlling rule is that when the payor's income exceeds the statutory maintenance cap, the court must first perform the guideline calculation up to the cap and then determine whether to award additional maintenance on income above the cap by considering the statutory factors and setting forth the factors considered. The court is not required to apply the formula to all income. Here, the judge followed the required two-step approach and explained the relevant factors, so affirmance is proper. (Derived from Mahoney v. Mahoney (n.d.).)