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Maine v. Moulton

Supreme Court of the United States · 1985 · Criminal Procedure

Criminal ProcedureSixth AmendmentRight to CounselSixth Amendmentright to counselMassiah doctrinedeliberate elicitationknowing circumvention

Facts

Moulton and his codefendant Colson had already been indicted and had appeared with counsel on theft-by-receiving charges. Colson later confessed to police, agreed to cooperate, and with police approval recorded phone calls and wore a body wire at a December 26 meeting that police knew was arranged so Moulton and Colson could discuss the pending charges and plan their defense. During that meeting, Colson repeatedly prompted Moulton for details about the crimes, producing numerous incriminating statements. At trial, the State introduced portions of the December 26 recording concerning the thefts for which Moulton had already been indicted.

Issue

Whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated when, after indictment and assertion of counsel, the State uses a cooperating codefendant to record conversations with the accused about pending charges and then introduces the accused's incriminating statements at trial. Also, whether the State's asserted legitimate purpose of investigating threats and possible new crimes avoids suppression of those statements as to the pending charges.

Rule

Once the right to counsel has attached and been asserted, the State has an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents that right. The Sixth Amendment is violated when the State knowingly exploits or intentionally creates an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel through a state agent and thereby obtains incriminating statements about pending charges; statements pertaining to those pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges even if the police were also investigating other crimes.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

A grand jury in Ohio indicts Devin Cross for receiving stolen construction equipment, and he appears with counsel. Later, his indicted codefendant, Lena Ortiz, agrees to cooperate with detectives in Cleveland; after officers learn Devin wants to meet Lena to go over the pending case and discuss defense strategy, they equip Lena with a hidden recorder, and Devin makes incriminating statements about the charged equipment thefts.

At Devin’s trial on the pending theft charges, are the recorded statements admissible?

Explanation. After adversary proceedings begin, the accused is entitled to rely on counsel as the medium between himself and the State. The State violates the Sixth Amendment when it knowingly exploits or intentionally creates an opportunity for its agent to obtain incriminating statements about pending charges in counsel’s absence. It does not matter that the defendant initiated the meeting; knowing exploitation is enough. The statements are inadmissible at the trial of those pending charges.