Marsh v. Alabama

Supreme Court of the United States · 1946 · Property
326 U.S. 501 (1946)
Updated
PropertyFirst AmendmentCompany townsState actioncompany townprivate propertypublic functionfreedom of press

Facts

Chickasaw, Alabama, was owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, but it had all the characteristics of an ordinary town, including residences, streets, a business block, stores, and a post office, and its business district was freely accessible to and used by the public. Appellant, a Jehovah's Witness, stood on the company-owned sidewalk near the post office and attempted to distribute religious literature. The company had posted notices forbidding solicitation without written permission, warned appellant that no permit would be issued, and ordered her to leave. After she refused, a deputy sheriff employed by the company arrested her, and she was prosecuted under Alabama's criminal trespass statute.

Issue

May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, impose criminal punishment on a person who distributes religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town that is open to the public and functions like any other town, merely because the company holds legal title to the property?

Rule

Ownership of property does not always confer absolute dominion. When a private owner opens property for use by the public in general and the property functions as a community town or business district, the State may not use its criminal trespass law to permit the owner to curtail the freedoms of press and religion guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Iron Mesa Minerals owns the entire unincorporated community of Red Bluff, Arizona, including its homes, streets, retail block, and a postal counter operated by the federal government. The public routinely drives in from nearby areas to shop, mail packages, and walk the sidewalks. When Lena Ortiz hands out religious pamphlets on the sidewalk outside the retail block, town security orders her to leave; after she refuses, Arizona prosecutes her under a criminal trespass statute.

Is Lena's conviction most likely constitutional?

Explanation. The majority held that private title does not settle the constitutional question when the property is opened to the public and functions like an ordinary town. Where a company-owned community has the characteristics of a municipality and its shopping area and sidewalks are freely accessible to the public, the state cannot criminally enforce the owner's exclusion of religious literature distribution. The Court expressly rejected the idea that state-law dedication is necessary to trigger the federal constitutional analysis.