Maryland v. Craig

Supreme Court of the United States · 1990 · Evidence

497 U.S. 836 (1990)

Updated August 1, 2026

Evidencechild witnessesCCTVConfrontation ClauseSixth Amendmentface-to-face confrontationchild abuse victimsone-way closed circuit television

Facts

Before Craig's trial on charges including child abuse and sexual offenses against a 6-year-old child, the State invoked a Maryland statute allowing child victims to testify by one-way closed circuit television if in-court testimony would cause serious emotional distress such that the child could not reasonably communicate. Under the procedure, the child, prosecutor, and defense counsel were in a separate room, while the judge, jury, and defendant remained in the courtroom; the child could not see the defendant, but the defendant could communicate electronically with counsel, and the testimony was subject to contemporaneous objection and cross-examination. The State presented expert testimony that the child witnesses would suffer serious emotional distress and have difficulty communicating if required to testify in Craig's presence. The trial court permitted the procedure, Craig was convicted, and the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed because it believed the showing under Coy was insufficient.

Issue

Does the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause categorically forbid a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying outside the defendant's physical presence by one-way closed circuit television? If not, what findings are constitutionally required before a State may use that procedure?

Rule

The Confrontation Clause reflects a preference, not an absolute requirement, for face-to-face confrontation at trial. A State may use a procedure denying physical face-to-face confrontation only when the denial is necessary to further an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. In the child-abuse context, the trial court must make a case-specific finding that use of the procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness, that the trauma would be caused by the defendant's presence rather than the courtroom generally, and that the distress is more than de minimis; Maryland's statutory standard requiring serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate is constitutionally sufficient.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a criminal prosecution in Columbus, Ohio, the State charges Devin Holt with sexually abusing a 9-year-old child. After hearing expert testimony that this particular child would suffer severe distress and be unable to answer questions in Devin's physical presence, the judge permits the child to testify from another room by one-way video; the child is under oath, defense counsel cross-examines contemporaneously, and the judge, jury, and Devin watch the child's demeanor live on a monitor while Devin can communicate electronically with counsel.

Is the procedure most likely consistent with the Confrontation Clause?

Explanation. The majority held that face-to-face confrontation is preferred but not absolute. A State may deny physical face-to-face confrontation when doing so is necessary to further an important public policy—here, protecting a child abuse victim from trauma caused by the defendant's presence—and when reliability is otherwise assured through oath, full contemporaneous cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact. The Constitution does not additionally require that the child see the defendant or that the judge personally question the child first.