Mastland, Inc. v. Evans Furniture

Supreme Court of Iowa · Torts

TortsNegligenceParental supervisionRes ipsa loquiturLandlord-tenantchild negligencetender yearsimputed negligence

Facts

A landlord leased a single-family residence to Jack Evans, apparently on behalf of Evans Furniture, Inc., and Jack's daughter Angela lived there with her two young children. Angela put her two-year-nine-month-old son Nick down for a nap, then found him and his room on fire; investigation showed Nick had started the fire by playing with a cigarette lighter in his crib. The landlord sued on theories including imputed negligence, negligent supervision, res ipsa loquitur, and breach of lease. Evidence showed the adults kept cigarettes and lighters on their persons, did not leave them out, had never seen Nick play with a lighter, and did not know how he obtained it.

Issue

Whether the landlord could recover fire damages by imputing negligence from a two-year-nine-month-old child or from the child's mother to the tenant, by relying on res ipsa loquitur, or by claiming the lease required the tenant to return the premises in the same condition despite the absence of proven negligence. The case also asked whether a child of that age can be negligent as a matter of law.

Rule

Under Iowa law, a child's negligence ordinarily depends on the child's age, intelligence, and experience, but a court may determine incapacity as a matter of law when the child is so young that reasonable minds could not differ; at least as to children three years of age and under, a child is incapable of negligence. Parents must exercise reasonable care to control a minor child only when they know or have reason to know they can control the child and know or should know of the necessity and opportunity to do so. Res ipsa loquitur applies only if the instrumentality was under the defendant's exclusive control and the event is of a kind that ordinarily would not happen if reasonable care had been used. Under the lease language and applicable law, a tenant is liable for fire damage only if it resulted from the tenant's deliberate or negligent acts or acts the tenant knowingly permitted.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Des Moines, a duplex owned by Prairie Elm Properties was damaged when tenant Daniel Voss's 2-year-11-month-old daughter ignited a curtain after somehow obtaining a barbecue lighter. The landlord sues Daniel, arguing the child's negligence should be imputed to him because she caused the fire.

How should the court rule on the imputed-negligence theory based on the child's conduct?

Explanation. The majority held that at least as to children three years of age and under, a child is incapable of negligence as a matter of law. That removes any predicate negligence that could be imputed to an adult tenant. The court rejected the idea that capacity must always go to the factfinder when the child is so young that reasonable minds could not differ. (Derived from Mastland, Inc. v. Evans Furniture (n.d.).)