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McKune v. Lile

Supreme Court of the United States · 2002 · Criminal Procedure
Criminal ProcedureFifth AmendmentSelf-IncriminationPrison AdministrationPrison RehabilitationFifth AmendmentSelf-Incrimination Clauseprison rehabilitation

Facts

Robert G. Lile was a convicted sex offender in Kansas custody who, a few years before release, was ordered to participate in the State's Sexual Abuse Treatment Program. The program required him to complete an admission-of-responsibility form, disclose his full sexual history including uncharged offenses, and submit to a polygraph; Kansas did not provide immunity, and some disclosed information could potentially be used in future criminal proceedings. When Lile refused on Fifth Amendment grounds, prison officials reduced his privilege status from Level III to Level I and transferred him to a maximum-security unit, resulting in reduced visitation, earnings, work opportunities, canteen access, possession of a television, and more restrictive living conditions. Kansas used these consequences as incentives to encourage participation in a program designed to promote acceptance of responsibility and reduce recidivism among sex offenders.

Issue

Whether Kansas violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by requiring a convicted sex offender to admit responsibility and disclose past sexual misconduct as part of a prison treatment program, on pain of losing prison privileges and being transferred to a less desirable housing unit. More specifically, the question was whether those consequences amounted to unconstitutional compulsion.

Rule

A prison clinical rehabilitation program that bears a rational relation to a legitimate penological objective does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when the adverse consequences for nonparticipation are related to the program's objectives and do not constitute atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. In assessing compulsion, courts must account for the restraints inherent in prison life and the State's legitimate interests in rehabilitation and prison administration.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
At a state prison in Columbus, Ohio, officials require inmates convicted of arson to attend a fire-setting rehabilitation program before release. The program requires participants to describe the offense of conviction and discuss prior fire-setting incidents; inmates who refuse are moved from a preferred medium-security dorm to a less desirable unit and lose access to the gym, higher-paying prison jobs, and weekend visitation, but their sentence length, parole eligibility, and good-time credits remain unchanged.

If an inmate challenges the policy under the Fifth Amendment, what is the strongest basis for upholding the program?

Explanation. Under the majority opinion, a prison rehabilitation program that bears a rational relation to a legitimate penological objective does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause when adverse consequences for refusing to participate are related to the program's objectives and do not impose atypical and significant hardships compared with ordinary prison life. The loss of privileges and transfer to less desirable housing, without any effect on sentence length, parole, or good-time credits, is the type of consequence the Court treated as insufficiently coercive in the prison setting. The majority did not hold that prisoners lose all Fifth Amendment protection, nor that immunity is constitutionally required.