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Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. United States

United States Court of Claims · Civil Procedure
Civil ProcedureGovernment ContractsSuspension of Workconstructive suspensiongovernment delaypartial suspensionequitable adjustmentproximate cause

Facts

Plaintiff's predecessor contracted with the Army Corps of Engineers to construct locks and dam works, but an existing state highway crossed part of the work site and had to be relocated before plaintiff could excavate the middle lock wall area. The contract stated the old highway would be opened to plaintiff about December 1, 1955, but the Government did not make it available until April 14, 1956, and did not issue a formal suspension order, so plaintiff kept men and equipment mobilized. Plaintiff claimed increased excavation costs, idled equipment costs, and overall delay costs from the Government's failure to turn over the site on time. The Board later denied recovery on the ground that plaintiff lacked an underpass during part of the period and that abnormal rainfall would have delayed it anyway.

Issue

Under the pre-1960 Suspension of Work Clause, was plaintiff entitled to an equitable adjustment when the Government's failure to turn over part of the site caused an unreasonably long constructive partial suspension, even though the Board found other factors such as the absence of an underpass and heavy rainfall would also have delayed performance? A further issue was whether this court or the Board should determine quantum.

Rule

Under the pre-1960 Suspension of Work Clause, once a Government-caused suspension unreasonably delays the work, the entitlement question is whether that delay caused any additional expense or loss to the contractor. The contractor may recover if the Government's delay was the proximate cause of additional loss, even if some other occurrence might hypothetically have caused a like delay during the same period; recovery is denied only if the Government's delay did not cause the additional loss because some other superseding intervening factor caused the loss independently. A constructive suspension has the same effect and consequences as an actual suspension, and damages must be assessed as if the suspension order should have been issued.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Pine Harbor Builders contracted with a federal agency to build a floodgate near St. Louis, Missouri. The agency promised to clear a rail spur crossing the center of the site by March 1 but did not do so until June 15, and it never issued a suspension order, so Pine Harbor kept crews and machines ready for the blocked phase of work.

Under a pre-1960 Suspension of Work Clause, which is the strongest basis for Pine Harbor's entitlement to relief?

Explanation. Under the majority rule, failure to provide necessary site access can amount to a constructive partial suspension even without a formal order. Entitlement under the pre-1960 clause turns on whether the government-caused unreasonable delay caused any additional expense or loss. Complete stoppage, bad faith, and a written order are not required. (Derived from Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. United States (n.d.).)