Millbrook Hunt, Inc. v. Smith

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department · 1998 · Property

PropertyEasementsLicenseseasementlicensenature of the rightinterest in landdefinite term

Facts

Millbrook Hunt, Inc. and the defendant's predecessor in title entered into a 1987 "Lease and Easement Agreement" concerning a 285-acre parcel in Dutchess County. The Agreement leased a particular one-quarter acre parcel to the Hunt for 75 years and, under paragraph 6, reserved to the Hunt an absolute right to fox hunt on the remaining land. After buying the property, Smith objected to hunting, sought to turn the land into a wildlife habitat and nature preserve, and ejected Hunt members who were maintaining fox-hunting trails. The Hunt then sued for a declaration that it held an easement and to enjoin Smith from interfering with its use.

Issue

Did the Agreement grant the Hunt an easement over Smith's property, or did it confer only a revocable license that Smith could terminate? A related question was whether the grantor's retained rights to develop the land and redirect trails prevented the Hunt's interest from being an easement.

Rule

To determine the true character of an interest in land, a court examines the nature of the right rather than the label given by the parties. An easement implies an interest in land ordinarily created by grant and is permanent in nature, while a license is a mere personal privilege to do acts on another's land without any estate therein. A right granted for a definite period and not subject to complete exclusion by the grantor may constitute an easement rather than a revocable license.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Asheville, North Carolina, Rowan Fields signed a document titled "Revocable Permission Agreement" granting Blue Ridge Riding Society the exclusive right to cross her 180-acre farm on horseback for organized trail rides for 60 years. The agreement also allowed Rowan to move the riding paths when she built new barns, but it did not let her bar the society from the farm altogether.

If Rowan later claims the title of the document proves the society received only a license, how should a court most likely rule?

Explanation. A court determines the character of the interest by examining the substance of the rights created rather than the title the parties used. A right granted for a definite period that gives the grantee an interest in using the land, and that the grantor cannot terminate by completely excluding the grantee, is treated as an easement rather than a mere personal privilege. Rowan's ability to relocate paths for development does not by itself convert the interest into a license. (Derived from Millbrook Hunt, Inc. v. Smith (1998).)