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Miller-El v. Dretke

Supreme Court of the United States · 2005 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawEqual ProtectionJury SelectionBatsonBatsonperemptory strikesracial discriminationjury selection

Facts

At Miller-El's capital murder trial, prosecutors used peremptory strikes against 10 qualified black venire members, and only 1 black venire member served. After Batson was decided while his appeal was pending, the Texas trial court held a remand hearing and accepted the prosecutors' stated race-neutral reasons for the strikes as credible. Miller-El later sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the prosecutors had struck black venire members because of race. The record also included evidence of side-by-side similarities between struck black jurors and accepted nonblack jurors, disparate questioning of black and nonblack panelists, jury shuffles, and historical evidence of discriminatory jury-selection practices in the Dallas County District Attorney's Office.

Issue

Whether, under AEDPA, the Texas court unreasonably determined the facts in rejecting Miller-El's Batson claim by accepting the prosecutors' race-neutral explanations for striking black venire members. More specifically, the question was whether the record showed purposeful racial discrimination in the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges.

Rule

Under Batson, once the State offers race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes, the court must assess whether the defendant has proved purposeful discrimination by evaluating the plausibility of those reasons in light of all relevant circumstances. At Batson's third step, evidence of pretext includes comparative juror analysis showing that a prosecutor's stated reason for striking a black panelist applies equally to a similarly situated nonblack juror who was allowed to serve. On federal habeas review, relief is available when the state court's contrary factual determination is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence and is an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1).

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a murder trial in Phoenix, the prosecutor used a peremptory strike on Darnell Price, a Black veniremember, stating that Price seemed too reluctant to impose a life-without-parole sentence because he mentioned that people can change. Price had also said repeatedly that he would follow the law and impose the sentence if the statutory findings were met. The prosecutor accepted two white jurors who likewise said people can change but were not questioned further on that point.

At Batson's third step, which is the strongest conclusion?

Explanation. At step three, the court must assess the plausibility of the prosecutor's stated reason in light of all relevant circumstances. A side-by-side comparison showing that the same concern applied to similar nonblack jurors who were accepted is evidence of pretext. The majority opinion rejected the idea that any facially neutral reason automatically suffices, did not require proof of a historical pattern as a prerequisite under Batson, and did not require jurors to be identical in every respect.