Morissette v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States · 1952 · Criminal Law

342 U.S. 246 (1952)

Updated August 1, 2026

Criminal Lawmens rea presumptionmens reacriminal intentstrict liabilitypublic welfare offenses18 U.S.C. § 641knowing conversion

Facts

Morissette took spent bomb casings from a government bombing range in Michigan, loaded about three tons onto his truck, crushed them, and sold them for $84. He acted openly in daylight, made no effort to conceal what he was doing, and later told authorities he thought the casings were abandoned and unwanted. At trial he testified that he lacked any intent to steal, but the trial judge ruled that belief in abandonment was no defense and instructed the jury that if he intentionally took the property without permission from government land, he was guilty. The court also treated felonious intent as presumed from his act of taking.

Issue

Does 18 U.S.C. § 641 eliminate the requirement of criminal intent for stealing or knowingly converting government property merely because the statute does not expressly mention intent for every term it uses? If intent is an element, may the trial court withhold that issue from the jury and presume it from the taking alone?

Rule

Mere omission of any mention of intent from 18 U.S.C. § 641 will not be construed as eliminating criminal intent from the crimes it defines. For common-law-derived larceny-type offenses such as stealing and knowing conversion, Congress is presumed to have incorporated the traditional mental element absent clear contrary direction. When intent is an ingredient of the crime, its existence is a question of fact for the jury, and courts may not conclusively or artificially presume intent from the isolated act of taking.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Nevada, Lena Ortiz enters a fenced federal storage lot and takes several coils of scrap copper left beside a demolished warehouse. She loads them openly at noon, later tells investigators she thought they had been discarded, and is charged under a federal statute punishing anyone who "steals or knowingly converts" government property but says nothing more about intent.

How should a court treat the statute's silence about intent?

Explanation. For common-law-derived offenses such as stealing and knowing conversion, mere omission of intent language does not eliminate mens rea. The majority held that when Congress borrows traditional larceny-type terms, courts presume Congress adopted their settled mental element unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise. The statute therefore is not read as strict liability merely because it is silent.