Moseley v. General Motors Corp.

Court of Appeals of Georgia · 1994 · Civil Procedure

213 Ga. App. 875 (1994)

Updated July 19, 2026

Civil ProcedureMotions in limineEvidencePunitive damagesProduct liabilitysubstantial similarityother incidentsmotion in limine

Facts

Shannon Moseley was killed after his 1985 GMC pickup was struck on the driver's side and its side saddle fuel tank ruptured and caught fire. The plaintiffs sued GM and obtained compensatory damages, $1 for pain and suffering, and $101,000,000 in punitive damages. Before trial, the court ruled that other lawsuits involving fuel-fed fires could not be mentioned to the jury unless plaintiffs first showed substantial similarity outside the jury's presence, but plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly referred to 120 lawsuits and numerous deaths without making that showing. The trial also included disputes over testimony from a former GM engineer, a deceased engineer's deposition from unrelated employment litigation, redesign evidence, a pending NHTSA investigation, and punitive-damages instructions.

Issue

Whether multiple evidentiary and instructional rulings required reversal of the judgment against GM, including repeated references to other lawsuits without a showing of substantial similarity, admission of unrelated deposition testimony and a pending NHTSA investigation, and failure to define the clear-and-convincing standard for punitive damages. The court also addressed whether subsequent remedial measures may be admitted in strict liability cases and whether punitive damages can be considered in calculating prejudgment interest.

Rule

In a product liability case, evidence or reference to other incidents is admissible on notice and punitive-damages issues only after a showing of substantial similarity; violation of a motion in limine barring such references preserves error without further objection. In Georgia, a former employee's nonprivileged knowledge gained through employment is not made privileged merely because the employee worked with corporate counsel, prior testimony of a deceased witness is admissible only when the prior action involved substantially the same parties and issues and offered a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination, and a pending investigation that does not tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue is irrelevant. Evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible in strict liability cases, but where negligence and strict liability are tried together the jury must be instructed on the limited use of that evidence; and when both preponderance and clear-and-convincing standards apply, the court must define both for the jury.

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In a product liability trial in Atlanta, the judge grants Ridgeway Tools' motion in limine barring any mention of other customer injuries unless the plaintiffs first prove substantial similarity outside the jury's presence. During opening and again through witness examinations, plaintiff's counsel tells the jury that Ridgeway has faced "dozens of claims" involving "many severe injuries," and defense counsel objects only the first time.

On appeal after a verdict for the plaintiff, what is the strongest argument for Ridgeway?

Explanation. Where a trial court's in limine ruling is violated, further objection at trial is unnecessary to preserve appellate review. The point of the motion is to prevent prejudicial statements before the jury. Repeated references to many other claims or injuries, without the required foundational showing, are highly inflammatory and may require reversal even if the evidence itself was never formally introduced. (Derived from Moseley v. General Motors Corp. (n.d.).)