Murphy v. Murphy

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third Appellate District, Seneca County · 2021 · Family Law

2021 Ohio 101 (2021)

Updated July 19, 2026

family lawdivorceretirement-property divisionfinal appealable ordersDOPOQDROproperty divisionvoid vs voidable

Facts

The divorce decree awarded Helen 62.5 percent of Larry's OPERS pension and 100 percent of his deferred compensation account accrued through December 2, 2015, and directed the parties to take steps to effectuate the division. In 2017, the trial court entered a DOPO giving Helen 50 percent of Larry's OPERS benefit and a QDRO awarding her 100 percent of the deferred compensation balance as of December 2, 2015; neither party appealed those orders. After later disputes over implementation, Helen moved to journalize an August 13, 2018 agreement that she claimed required Larry to take steps so she could receive her OPERS share in a lump sum, while Larry denied that was the agreement. The magistrate found the parties had agreed as Helen asserted but recommended denying the motion because Helen had waived journalization by not requesting it earlier; the trial court denied the motion, vacated all post-decree retirement orders as void, and dismissed Helen's annuity motion without prejudice.

Issue

May a trial court sua sponte vacate a post-decree DOPO and related QDROs as void on the ground that the DOPO modified the property division in the divorce decree? Also, did the trial court properly rule on Helen's objection to the magistrate's denial of her motion to journalize, and was the dismissal without prejudice of her annuity motion a final appealable order?

Rule

A DOPO implements a divorce decree's pension division and may not be used to modify the decree's property division; if a DOPO varies from, enlarges, or diminishes the decree's award, it improperly modifies the decree. But such an improper DOPO is voidable, not void, and a trial court has no inherent authority to sua sponte vacate a voidable judgment. A QDRO consistent with the decree does not modify it and is not void for lack of jurisdiction. When objections to a magistrate's decision are filed, the trial court must independently review the objected matters under Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). A dismissal without prejudice is generally not a final appealable order if the claim can be refiled.

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In Columbus, an Ohio divorce decree awarded Tessa Nolan 65% of Evan Nolan's municipal pension. A year later, the domestic relations court entered a division order awarding Tessa 50% of the pension after the parties submitted paperwork, and neither side appealed. Two years later, without any pending motion seeking relief from that order, the judge declared the order void and vacated it on the court's own initiative.

Was the court's sua sponte vacatur proper?

Explanation. A division order implementing a pension may not vary from, enlarge, or diminish the allocation set out in the divorce decree. But if it does so, the defect makes the order voidable, not void. Because a court may sua sponte vacate only a void judgment, the judge lacked authority to vacate this order on the court's own initiative.