Nectow v. City of Cambridge

Supreme Court of the United States · 1928 · Property

277 U.S. 183 (1928)

Updated July 23, 2026

PropertyZoningDue Processas-applied challengeFourteenth Amendmentpolice powersubstantial relationarbitrary regulation

Facts

Cambridge had a comprehensive zoning ordinance dividing the city into residential, business, and unrestricted districts, and the plaintiff's locus of about 29,000 square feet was placed in a residential district allowing only limited residential-type uses. The locus bordered unrestricted land to the east and south, including a large Ford auto assembling factory, with a soap factory and nearby railroad tracks also in the vicinity, while residentially restricted land lay to the north and west. The master found that no practical residential use could be made of the locus because development would not yield an adequate return, and further found that placing the land in a residence district would not promote the health, safety, convenience, or general welfare of inhabitants of that part of the city. The zoning restriction prevented business and industrial use of the locus even though the remainder of the plaintiff's tract was unrestricted, and a prior sale contract for most of the tract failed because of the restriction.

Issue

Whether Cambridge's zoning ordinance, though valid in general, violated the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the plaintiff's parcel because the residential classification had no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.

Rule

Courts should not overturn zoning determinations unless the action has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety, or public welfare. The governmental power to restrict land use by zoning is not unlimited, and such a restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.

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In Providence, Mara Levin owns a narrow vacant parcel at the edge of a residential district. The lots immediately to its south and east are in an unrestricted district and contain a freight terminal and a machine shop, while homes lie across the streets to the north and west. After a hearing and site inspection, a trial court finds that the parcel has no practical residential use and that keeping it residential would not promote local health, safety, convenience, or general welfare.

If Mara brings a due process challenge to the ordinance as applied to her parcel, what is the strongest result?

Explanation. An otherwise valid zoning scheme may still violate due process as applied to a particular parcel if the restriction has no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Where a factfinder determines the parcel has no practical permitted use and that the restriction does not promote those public ends, the restriction is arbitrary as applied and cannot stand.