Penry v. Lynaugh

Supreme Court of the United States · 1989 · Federal Courts

Federal CourtsHabeas CorpusCapital PunishmentEighth AmendmentRetroactivityTeaguenew ruleretroactivity

Facts

At the penalty phase of his Texas capital trial, Penry introduced evidence that he was mentally retarded, had organic brain damage, had the mental age of a young child, had poor impulse control, and had suffered severe childhood abuse. Texas required the jury to answer three special issues concerning deliberateness, future dangerousness, and provocation, and the jury was instructed to consider all the evidence but was not instructed that it could treat Penry's evidence as mitigating and decline to impose death on that basis. The jury answered all special issues yes, which required a death sentence. Penry argued on habeas that the instructions gave the jury no vehicle to give effect to his mitigating evidence and that the Eighth Amendment barred his execution because of his mental retardation.

Issue

Whether, on federal habeas review, Penry's challenge to the Texas capital sentencing instructions sought a new rule barred by Teague, and if not, whether the Eighth Amendment was violated because the jury could not consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence under the Texas special issues. Also, whether the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the execution of a mentally retarded offender like Penry.

Rule

A capital sentencer must be permitted to consider and give effect to any relevant mitigating evidence concerning the defendant's background, character, or the circumstances of the offense. In Texas, when mitigating evidence has relevance to moral culpability beyond the scope of the special issues, the jury must, upon request, receive instructions that provide a vehicle for expressing a reasoned moral response to that evidence. A rule requiring that result is not a new rule under Teague because it is dictated by Lockett and Eddings and by the assurances underlying Jurek. However, the Eighth Amendment does not categorically bar execution of mentally retarded offenders where insufficient objective evidence shows a national consensus against that punishment.

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In Houston, Devon Price was sentenced to death under a capital scheme that required jurors to answer narrow special questions. At sentencing, Devon introduced evidence of significant intellectual limitations and severe childhood neglect. Years later on federal habeas, after his conviction became final, he argues that the jury instructions gave jurors no way to give mitigating effect to that evidence, relying on preexisting Supreme Court cases requiring consideration of mitigating evidence.

Is Devon's claim barred on collateral review as seeking a "new rule"?

Explanation. A claim is not "new" under Teague if the result was dictated by precedent existing when the conviction became final. The majority held that earlier cases already required that the sentencer be able to consider and give effect to relevant mitigating evidence, so a habeas petitioner raising that sort of claim does not seek a new rule merely because the Court later applied that principle to his case.