People v. Fichtner

Supreme Court of Colorado · Criminal Law

Criminal LawRestitutionJury InstructionsPlain ErrorComplicityMenacingrestitutionvictim of his conduct

Facts

During a confrontation over removal of property from leased premises, Fichtner and co-defendant Lesney arrived armed, and both participated in threatening and assaultive conduct against Bement and his family. After the assault, Lesney shot and punctured a tire on Bement's truck as the victims were leaving. Fichtner was convicted of third-degree assault and menacing against Harriet Firestone, and the trial court ordered restitution for medical bills and the damaged tire. The court's menacing instruction correctly listed the elements but did not separately define "serious bodily injury."

Issue

Whether a defendant may be ordered to pay restitution for property damage directly inflicted by a co-defendant during their joint criminal conduct when the defendant was also a complicitor. Whether the trial court's failure to define "serious bodily injury" in an otherwise correct jury instruction on menacing with a deadly weapon constituted plain error.

Rule

For restitution purposes, criminal liability turns on culpability rather than direct causation; where defendants are participants and complicitiors in the same criminal acts, each is responsible for damage he caused and also for damage caused by the other during the commission of the crime. An omitted definitional instruction does not amount to plain error unless, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the omission casts serious doubt on the basic fairness of the trial; where the omitted matter was not actually contested and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, reversal is not warranted.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Pueblo, Nora Velez and Damon Krell entered a warehouse together to intimidate a former coworker who was loading tools into his van. Nora blocked the exit and shouted encouragement while Damon swung a metal bar at the coworker and, as they fled, smashed the van's windshield.

Nora is convicted as a complicitor in the same criminal episode. May the sentencing court order Nora to pay restitution for the windshield damage even though Damon struck it?

Explanation. The majority treated restitution as turning on criminal culpability, not direct physical causation. When two defendants are participants and complicitiors in the same criminal acts, each is responsible for damage he caused and also damage caused by the other during the commission of the crime. That makes Nora jointly responsible for the windshield damage. (Derived from People v. Fichtner (n.d.).)