EvidenceJury instructionsConsentCriminal sexual conductconsent defensethird-degree criminal sexual conductreasonable beliefsua sponte instruction
Facts
At trial, defendant claimed he was not guilty because the complainant consented to any sexual contact. The trial court instructed the jury on third-degree criminal sexual conduct using CJI 20:4:01 and 20:4:06 and separately instructed that if the evidence did not convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual acts were not consented to, defendant was not guilty. Defendant did not object to that instruction at trial. On appeal, he argued the instruction was inadequate because it focused on the complainant’s consent rather than on his reasonable belief that she consented.
Issue
Was the trial court required to instruct the jury, even absent an objection, that defendant should be acquitted if he reasonably and honestly believed the complainant consented to sexual intercourse? More specifically, were the consent instructions inadequate because they did not define consent in terms of defendant’s reasonable belief?
Rule
No Michigan case law requires a trial court to define consent in a criminal sexual conduct case in terms of the defendant’s reasonable and honest belief that the complainant consented. Instructions taken directly from CJI 20:4:01 and 20:4:06 on third-degree criminal sexual conduct implicitly require the jury to find that the complainant did not consent before convicting.
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In a Michigan prosecution for third-degree criminal sexual conduct arising from events in Grand Rapids, Evan Mercer testified that the complainant agreed to the sexual contact. The judge instructed the jury with the standard third-degree criminal sexual conduct instructions and added that if the jurors were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual acts were not consented to, Evan was not guilty. Defense counsel did not request any additional instruction.
On appeal, Evan argues the court committed reversible error by failing, on its own initiative, to instruct that he must be acquitted if he honestly and reasonably believed the complainant consented. How should the appellate court rule?
Explanation. The majority held that no Michigan case law requires the trial court to define consent in terms of the defendant’s reasonable and honest belief, and the standard third-degree criminal sexual conduct instructions implicitly require a finding of nonconsent. Where the court also instructed that the defendant is not guilty unless the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual acts were not consented to, no sua sponte reasonable-belief instruction is required. (Derived from People v. Hale (1985).)