At sentencing, the court orally pronounced a one-year period of postrelease supervision for defendant's attempted possession conviction. The appellate court stated that this period was illegally low. Although the commitment sheet replaced that one-year period with a lawful period of 1 1/2 years, both sides agreed that this change was ineffective. Defendant argued that the illegally low term should nevertheless be allowed to stand.
Issue
When a sentencing court orally pronounces an unlawfully low term of postrelease supervision, may that term be validly corrected through the commitment sheet, or must the case be remanded for resentencing? Also, may the unlawfully low orally pronounced term simply be left in place?
Rule
If the court orally imposes an illegally low term of postrelease supervision, a later attempt to replace it with a lawful term through the commitment sheet is ineffective. The proper remedy is remand for resentencing at which the court pronounces the applicable lawful term of postrelease supervision.
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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Buffalo, Nolan Pierce pleaded guilty to a drug felony that required a two-year period of postrelease supervision. At sentencing, the judge orally imposed a prison term and stated that postrelease supervision would be "nine months," but the written commitment sheet later listed two years.
On Nolan's appeal, what is the proper disposition regarding postrelease supervision?
Explanation. The governing rule is that a lawful term of postrelease supervision must be pronounced by the court at sentencing. If the court orally imposes an illegally low term, a later attempt to substitute the lawful term solely through the commitment sheet is ineffective. The proper remedy is remand for resentencing so the court can pronounce the applicable lawful term in open court. (Derived from People v. Toscano (n.d.).)