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Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth

Supreme Court of the United States · 1976 · Constitutional Law
Constitutional LawAbortionPrivacyConsentParental ConsentSpousal ConsentMedical RegulationRoe framework

Facts

Missouri enacted a comprehensive abortion statute regulating abortions at all stages of pregnancy shortly after Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. The challenged provisions included a definition of viability, a requirement of the woman's written consent, spousal consent, parental consent for unmarried minors under 18, a prohibition on saline amniocentesis after 12 weeks, recordkeeping requirements, and a physician duty to preserve fetal life and health. Two Missouri physicians who performed abortions challenged these provisions because violations exposed them to criminal penalties. The Court evaluated each challenged provision against the constitutional standards announced in Roe and Doe.

Issue

Whether Missouri may, consistent with Roe and Doe, define viability as it did, require the woman's written consent, require spousal or parental consent for first-trimester abortions, ban saline amniocentesis after the first trimester, impose abortion-specific recordkeeping requirements, and require physicians at all stages to exercise care to preserve fetal life and health.

Rule

Before approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician and the woman, without state interference that gives a third party an absolute veto. After the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion procedures only in ways reasonably related to maternal health; after viability, the State may regulate to protect fetal life. Viability is a matter of medical judgment for the responsible attending physician, and reasonable recordkeeping aimed at maternal health that respects confidentiality may be permitted.

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Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Ohio, a statute provides that no abortion may be performed during the first 10 weeks of pregnancy on a married woman unless her husband signs a consent form. The only exception is when a physician certifies that the procedure is necessary to save the woman's life.

If challenged, how should a court rule on the constitutionality of the husband's-signature requirement?

Explanation. During the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the woman and her attending physician. A State may not delegate to a spouse a power to block that decision, because the State itself may not exercise that veto at that stage. The defect is the absolute third-party veto, not merely administrative inconvenience. (Derived from Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976).)