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Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of America

Supreme Court of the United States · 1983 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawLegislative VetoSeparation of PowersArticle Ilegislative vetoagency rulemakingindependent regulatory agenciesArticle I

Facts

One case involved § 202(c) of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, which allowed a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission proposal expanding incremental pricing to become effective unless disapproved by either House of Congress. Justice White described that veto provision as central to the legislative compromise that produced the Act, because it let Congress observe the initial phase before committing to broader incremental pricing. Another case involved § 21(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, under which an FTC trade regulation rule would become effective unless both Houses disapproved it. Justice White noted that Congress adopted the veto mechanism after extensive debate over the breadth of the FTC's rulemaking authority.

Issue

Whether legislative veto provisions applied to agency rulemaking, including one-house and two-house disapproval mechanisms directed at independent regulatory agencies, violate Article I of the Constitution. The dissent also identified, in the NGPA case, an additional question whether the veto provision was severable from the authorization for FERC to issue an expanded interim pricing rule.

Rule

According to Justice White's dissent, a legislative veto over independent agency rulemaking is constitutional because agency regulations become effective by congressional inaction, and congressional disapproval merely nullifies a proposed regulation and prevents any change in law. In his view, such disapproval is not equivalent to legislation requiring bicameralism and presentment.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Congress creates the Mid-Atlantic Communications Board, an independent regulatory body based in Philadelphia, and authorizes it to issue consumer-data rules. The statute provides that any rule will take effect 75 days after submission to Congress unless either the House or the Senate adopts a resolution disapproving it.

A trade association challenges the one-house disapproval mechanism after the Board proposes a sweeping privacy rule. Under the Court's disposition reflected in the provided opinion text, how should a court rule on the constitutionality of the mechanism?

Explanation. The Court summarily affirmed decisions striking legislative veto provisions governing agency rulemaking as unconstitutional in light of Chadha. That includes a one-house mechanism under which an agency rule becomes effective unless one chamber disapproves it. Justice White argued in dissent that such a device was constitutional, but that view was not the Court's disposition. (Derived from Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of America (1983).)