Pulliam v. Allen

Supreme Court of the United States · 1984 · Federal Courts

Federal CourtsSection 1983Judicial ImmunityAttorney's FeesInjunctive Reliefjudicial immunityprospective reliefinjunction

Facts

Respondent Allen was arrested for a Class 3 misdemeanor punishable only by a fine, but the magistrate set a $250 bond; when he could not post it, he was jailed for 14 days. Respondent Nicholson was arrested several times for public drunkenness, a Class 4 misdemeanor punishable only by a fine, and was jailed for two to six days each time after failing to post bond. The district court found it was the magistrate's practice to require bond for nonincarcerable offenses and to jail those unable to meet it. The court held that practice violated due process and equal protection, enjoined it, and later awarded respondents $7,691.09 in fees and costs.

Issue

Does judicial immunity bar prospective injunctive relief under § 1983 against a state judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity? If not, does judicial immunity nevertheless bar an award of attorney's fees under § 1988 when such prospective relief is properly awarded?

Rule

Judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity under § 1983. When prospective relief is properly awarded in a § 1983 action, judicial immunity also does not bar an award of attorney's fees under § 1988, because Congress intended fees to be available even where immunity doctrines preclude or limit damages.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Dayton, Ohio, Judge Marisol Kent of the Riverbend Municipal Court routinely requires cash bond before release on a category of ordinance violations punishable only by fines. Several indigent arrestees file a federal action under § 1983 seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the practice.

Judge Kent moves to dismiss on the ground of absolute judicial immunity because she set bond while acting in her judicial capacity. How should the federal court rule?

Explanation. The majority held that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity under § 1983. The key distinction is between immunity from damages and immunity from prospective relief; the former remains, but the latter does not. The fact that the challenged conduct was judicial in nature does not itself defeat a properly framed request for declaratory or injunctive relief.