Raines v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia · 2020 · Criminal Law

Criminal LawJuvenile sentencingLife without paroleSixth AmendmentEighth Amendmentjuvenile LWOPirreparably corruptpermanently incorrigible

Facts

Raines was convicted of malice murder and other crimes and originally sentenced to life without parole for malice murder. He was 17 years old when he committed the crimes. In an earlier appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia remanded for resentencing under Veal, which requires a distinct determination that a juvenile murderer is irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible before LWOP may be imposed. On remand, Raines argued that the Sixth Amendment required a jury, not a judge, to make that determination.

Issue

Does a defendant facing life without parole for a murder committed while he was a juvenile have a federal constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to have a jury, rather than a judge, determine whether he is irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible before LWOP may be imposed?

Rule

Under Georgia's murder sentencing statute, OCGA § 16-5-1(e)(1), a jury verdict finding a defendant guilty of murder establishes all facts necessary to authorize LWOP, so Apprendi does not require additional jury factfinding for that sentence. The Eighth Amendment limitation recognized in Miller, Montgomery, and Veal requires a sentencer to make a distinct determination that a juvenile offender is irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible before imposing LWOP, but that determination need not be made by a jury as a matter of federal constitutional law.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Fulton County, Georgia, 17-year-old Malik Turner was convicted by a jury of murder. At sentencing, the judge considered Malik's youth and background, stated on the record that Malik was permanently incorrigible, and imposed life without parole over Malik's objection that only a jury could make that determination.

If Malik appeals on the ground that the Federal Constitution required a jury to decide permanent incorrigibility before life without parole could be imposed, how should the court rule?

Explanation. The correct answer is A. Under the majority opinion, a Georgia juvenile convicted of murder has no federal constitutional right to have a jury determine whether he is irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible before LWOP is imposed. Georgia's murder statute already authorizes LWOP upon the murder conviction alone, and the required juvenile-specific determination arises from Eighth Amendment proportionality limits rather than a statutory fact that Apprendi requires a jury to find. (Derived from Raines v. State (n.d.).)