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Regenstreif v. Phelps

Supreme Court of Kentucky · 2004 · Torts
TortsNegligenceComparative negligenceSudden emergencysudden emergencycomparative negligencejury instructionblack ice

Facts

Phelps was driving into the Castlegate subdivision on a February morning when she lost control of her car on a curve, crossed the center line, and struck Regenstreif's vehicle head on. Phelps testified that the roads had been clear until she entered the subdivision, where she encountered a patch of ice that was not visible from her car and that she noticed only after the accident. Mrs. Piercy testified that the subdivision roads were slick, and the responding officer testified that ice was present and that her own cruiser skidded past the scene. Over the plaintiffs' objection, the trial court qualified Phelps's duties with a sudden emergency instruction, and the jury found Phelps not at fault.

Issue

Did the trial court err by qualifying Phelps's duties with a sudden emergency instruction in a comparative negligence case where there was evidence that black ice caused her to lose control? More specifically, did Kentucky's adoption of comparative negligence abolish the sudden emergency doctrine?

Rule

Kentucky's adoption of comparative negligence did not abolish the sudden emergency doctrine. When warranted by the evidence, a sudden emergency instruction may be given because the doctrine does not excuse fault but explains the conduct expected of an ordinarily prudent person suddenly confronted with an emergency not brought on by that person's own fault and allowing no time for deliberation.

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Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
On a January morning in Louisville, Dana Mercer was driving within the speed limit on a residential street that appeared merely wet. As she rounded a bend, her car hit an unseen sheet of black ice, slid across the center line, and struck Omar Reed's pickup; a mail carrier and responding officer both later testified that the ice was not visible and caused other vehicles to skid there that morning.

In Omar's negligence suit, Dana asks the court to give a sudden emergency instruction. What is the best ruling?

Explanation. The majority held that comparative negligence did not abolish the sudden emergency doctrine. When warranted by the evidence, the instruction may be given because it helps the jury evaluate whether the actor behaved as an ordinarily prudent person when suddenly confronted with an emergency allowing no time for deliberation and not brought on by the actor's own fault. Here, the unseen black ice and corroborating testimony support giving the instruction.