Richardson v. Marsh
Facts
Respondent and her codefendant Williams were tried jointly for crimes arising from a robbery and killings at Scott's home. The State introduced Williams' confession, but redacted it to omit all reference to respondent and indeed any indication that anyone other than Williams and Martin participated; the jury was instructed not to consider it against respondent, and Williams did not testify. Respondent later testified and placed herself in the car described in the confession, denying that she heard the conversation in which Martin said he would have to kill the victims after the robbery. In closing, the prosecutor linked respondent to that portion of the confession, though respondent had not objected at trial.
Issue
Does the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Bruton, bar admission at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant's confession when the confession is redacted to eliminate the defendant's name and any reference to the defendant's existence, but the confession becomes incriminating when linked with other evidence introduced at trial?
Rule
The Confrontation Clause is not violated by admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name but any reference to the defendant's existence. Bruton applies to facially incriminating confessions, not to confessions that become incriminating only when linked with other evidence.
See the holding & full analysis
Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.
- The court's holding and reasoning
- Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
- 10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case
Test yourself
Dana argues the confession violated her Confrontation Clause rights because the jury could connect her to it through the later testimony. How should the court rule?