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Schiavone v. Fortune

Supreme Court of the United States · 1986 · Civil Procedure
Civil ProcedureFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)Relation BackStatute of LimitationsRule 15(c)relation backamended pleadingsmisnamed defendant

Facts

Petitioners filed diversity libel complaints on May 9, 1983, based on a Fortune magazine article, naming only "Fortune" as defendant and describing it as a foreign corporation with offices in the Time and Life Building. Fortune, however, was only a trademark and internal division of Time, Incorporated, not a separate corporation. Petitioners mailed the original complaints to Time's registered agent on May 20, after the limitations period had run at the latest on May 19; the agent received them on May 23 and refused service because Time was not named. Petitioners then amended the complaints in July 1983 to name "Fortune, also known as Time, Incorporated," and served Time on July 21.

Issue

Whether petitioners' amendment naming Time, Incorporated as defendant related back under Rule 15(c) when Time did not receive notice of the institution of the action until after the applicable one-year statute of limitations had expired. Also, whether the period allowed for service under Rule 4 extends the time for notice under Rule 15(c).

Rule

Relation back under Rule 15(c) for an amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted requires satisfaction of four factors: (1) the claim in the amendment must arise out of the conduct set forth in the original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have received notice of the institution of the action so it will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense; (3) that party must have known or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it; and (4) the notice and knowledge requirements must be satisfied within the applicable limitations period. Rule 4's time for service does not extend Rule 15(c)'s requirement of notice within the period provided by law for commencing the action.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In federal court in Chicago, Lena Ortiz filed a diversity defamation action 3 days before Illinois's 1-year limitations period expired. She named "CityScene" as defendant, believing it was a corporation, but CityScene was only a magazine title used by Midlake Media Group. Midlake first received the complaint 5 days after the limitations period expired, and Lena amended 2 months later to name Midlake Media Group.

Should the amendment relate back under Rule 15(c) as construed by the Supreme Court's majority opinion?

Explanation. The majority treated timely notice to the party to be added as the linchpin. An amendment changing defendants relates back only if the new party received notice and knew or should have known of the mistake within the period provided by law for commencing the action. Filing the original complaint on time is not enough when the added defendant first received notice after the statute ran.