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Schneckloth v. Bustamonte

Supreme Court of the United States · 1973 · Criminal Procedure
Criminal ProcedureFourth Amendmentconsentvoluntarinessknowledge of right to refuseconsent searchwarrant exceptionprobable cause exception

Facts

A police officer stopped a car at about 2:40 a.m. because one headlight and the license plate light were burned out. After the driver could not produce a license and the occupants got out of the car, the officer asked Alcala, who said the car belonged to his brother, if he could search the car; Alcala replied, "Sure, go ahead." No one was threatened with arrest, the officer's uncontradicted testimony was that matters were "very congenial," and testimony indicated Alcala helped by opening the trunk and glove compartment. Officers found three stolen checks under the left rear seat, and those checks were used against Bustamonte at trial.

Issue

When the State seeks to justify a warrantless search by consent, must it prove not only that the consent was free of coercion, but also that the person consenting knew he had a right to refuse? Put differently, is knowledge of the right to refuse a necessary prerequisite to a valid consent under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Rule

A consent search is valid under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments if the consent was in fact voluntarily given and was not the product of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact determined from the totality of all the circumstances, and although knowledge of the right to refuse consent is relevant, the prosecution need not prove such knowledge as a prerequisite to an effective consent.

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Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Late one afternoon in Tulsa, Officer Nina Kerr stopped Devin Soto for weaving within his lane. After checking his registration, she casually asked, "Mind if I look through the car?" Devin shrugged and said, "Yeah, okay," then stood by the curb while she searched. At the suppression hearing, the prosecution offered no evidence that Devin knew he could refuse.

If the State relies solely on consent to justify the warrantless search, which is the best analysis?

Explanation. The governing rule is that consent is valid if it was in fact voluntarily given and not the product of duress or coercion, express or implied. The prosecution need not prove knowledge of the right to refuse as a prerequisite, though that knowledge is relevant. A simple lack of proof on that one point does not by itself invalidate the search.