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SEC v. Jarkesy

Supreme Court of the United States · 2024 · Constitutional Law
Constitutional LawSeventh AmendmentArticle IIIPublic RightsAdministrative AdjudicationSeventh Amendmentjury trialSEC

Facts

After the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to seek civil penalties either in federal court or through in-house proceedings, the SEC investigated Jarkesy and Patriot28 for alleged securities fraud involving two investment funds. The SEC alleged they misrepresented investment strategies, lied about the funds' auditor and prime broker, and inflated the funds' value to collect larger management fees. Rather than sue in federal court, the SEC chose administrative adjudication and ultimately imposed a $300,000 civil penalty plus other sanctions. The legal issue turned on whether this agency proceeding, seeking civil penalties for antifraud violations, required a jury trial.

Issue

Whether the Seventh Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury trial when the SEC seeks civil penalties for securities fraud in an in-house administrative proceeding. Relatedly, whether the public-rights exception allows Congress to assign that action to agency adjudication without a jury.

Rule

A statutory action implicates the Seventh Amendment when it is legal in nature, determined by examining the cause of action and especially the remedy. SEC antifraud claims seeking civil penalties are legal in nature because the penalties are punitive rather than restorative and the claims closely track common law fraud; therefore, unless the matter falls within the public-rights exception, it must be adjudicated in an Article III court with a jury. The public-rights exception does not apply to actions that are in substance traditional common law suits involving private rights, even if Congress places them in a modern regulatory scheme and the Government is the party bringing the action.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
The Federal Markets Integrity Board charged Lena Ortiz, an investment adviser in Phoenix, with using false statements to attract clients. In an in-house proceeding, the Board seeks a $400,000 statutory penalty payable to the Treasury, and the statute says the money may be distributed to victims only if the agency later chooses to do so.

Under the majority's approach, which fact most strongly supports Lena's claim that she is entitled to a jury trial in an Article III court?

Explanation. The majority treated the remedy as the more important consideration. A monetary sanction is legal in nature when it punishes or deters rather than solely restores the status quo, and the lack of any obligation to return the money to victims confirms its punitive character. A modern regulatory setting, the Government's presence, and the statute's novelty do not remove the case from the Seventh Amendment. (Derived from SEC v. Jarkesy (n.d.).)