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Shelton v. Ernst & Young, LLP

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2001 · Civil Procedure

Civil ProcedureMotion to dismissSubject matter jurisdictionFailure to state a claimRule 11 sanctionsTitle VII300-day filing periodaccrual

Facts

Plaintiff, an African-American male, was hired by Ernst & Young in July 1998 and was terminated by the manager of the practice, Sylvia Pozarnsky, on April 30, 1999. Plaintiff alleged that he remained on Ernst & Young's payroll until June 15, 1999, but he filed his EEOC charge on March 22, 2000, 327 days after the April 30 termination. The amended complaint asserted discrimination claims under Title VII and/or the IHRA against Ernst & Young and Pozarnsky, and a breach of oral employment contract claim against Ernst & Young. Plaintiff did not allege that he filed a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights, and his contract allegations stated only that Ernst & Young had promised a higher management level, a raise, and a promotion within one year, while he had turned down or stopped pursuing other opportunities.

Issue

Whether plaintiff's Title VII claims were timely when his EEOC charge was filed more than 300 days after he was told he was terminated but less than 300 days after he was taken off payroll; whether the claims against the individual supervisor, any IHRA or emotional-distress claims, and the oral contract claim stated viable causes of action; and whether Rule 11 sanctions were warranted for pursuing legally baseless Title VII theories.

Rule

A Title VII plaintiff must file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the adverse employment action, and the limitations period begins when the plaintiff learns of the adverse decision, not when its later effects are felt or when payroll ends. A continuing-violation theory requires at least one discriminatory act within the limitations period; equitable estoppel requires active lulling or concealment by the defendant; equitable tolling requires inability to obtain evidence of discrimination within the period. Title VII does not impose individual liability on supervisors who do not independently qualify as employers. An IHRA claim requires exhaustion through the Illinois administrative process, emotional-distress claims inextricably linked to IHRA-covered discrimination are preempted, and an Illinois oral employment contract claim must allege a clear and definite duration and adequate consideration to overcome the presumption of at-will employment.

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In Chicago, Maya Torres was told on February 1 that her employment at Lakefront Analytics Group would end immediately. The company continued salary payments through March 20 under a separation arrangement. Maya filed an EEOC charge on November 25 of the same year, which was more than 300 days after February 1 but fewer than 300 days after March 20.

Is Maya's Title VII charge timely?

Explanation. The charge is untimely. The controlling rule is that the Title VII filing period runs from notice of the adverse employment decision, not from later financial effects such as remaining on payroll or receiving later pay. Once Maya learned on February 1 that she was terminated, the clock started. The later salary continuation was merely a consequence of the earlier decision, not a new discriminatory act. (Derived from Shelton v. Ernst & Young, LLP (2001).)