Slack v. McDaniel
Facts
Slack was convicted of second-degree murder in Nevada state court in 1990, and his direct appeal failed. He filed a federal habeas petition in 1991, but after deciding to pursue unexhausted claims in state court, he obtained dismissal without prejudice with leave to renew after exhaustion. After unsuccessful state postconviction proceedings, he filed a new federal petition in 1995 and later an amended petition in 1997. The State argued the petition was mixed and that claims not raised in 1991 were barred as an abuse of the writ; the district court treated the 1995 petition as second or successive and dismissed on that basis.
Issue
When a habeas petitioner seeks to appeal after AEDPA's effective date, does § 2253(c)'s certificate of appealability requirement apply even if the habeas case began in district court before AEDPA? If the district court dismissed on procedural grounds, what must the petitioner show for a COA, and is a petition filed after an earlier dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies a second or successive petition?
Rule
For appeals initiated after April 24, 1996, the right to appeal in habeas cases is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)'s certificate of appealability requirement, regardless of when the district court petition was filed. When a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the constitutional claim, a COA should issue only if the prisoner shows that reasonable jurists could debate both whether the petition states a valid constitutional claim and whether the procedural ruling was correct. A petition filed after an earlier petition was dismissed without merits adjudication for failure to exhaust state remedies is not a second or successive petition.
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Which statement best describes the certificate requirement governing Devin's appeal?