Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department · Family Law
Family LawCounsel feesfamily lawmatrimonial actioncounsel feesattorney's feesdiscretionfinancial circumstances
Facts
The parties had previously been divorced by judgment dated July 26, 1985. In a later order entered January 2, 1996, the Supreme Court, Kings County awarded the defendant former wife counsel fees in the sum of $7,000. The plaintiff former husband challenged that fee award on appeal. The appellate court evaluated the award based on the parties' financial circumstances and the circumstances of the case as a whole.
Issue
Did the Supreme Court improvidently exercise its discretion by directing the plaintiff former husband to pay a portion of the defendant former wife's counsel fees in the amount of $7,000?
Rule
In a matrimonial action, a court's decision to direct one party to pay a portion of the other party's counsel fees is a discretionary determination that should be evaluated in light of the financial circumstances of the parties and the circumstances of the case as a whole.
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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
After a divorce judgment in Buffalo, Dana Mercer petitions for post-judgment relief regarding support arrears. The trial court orders her former spouse, Eric Nolan, to pay $6,000 toward Dana's attorney's fees after finding that Eric earns substantially more and that the litigation had become unusually protracted. Eric appeals, arguing only that each side should pay its own lawyer.
What is the best basis for affirming the fee award?
Explanation. In a matrimonial action, directing one party to pay a portion of the other party's counsel fees is a discretionary determination. On appeal, the question is whether the trial court improvidently exercised its discretion, assessed in light of the parties' financial circumstances and the circumstances of the case as a whole. No bad-faith finding, categorical bar on post-judgment awards, or mathematical itemization rule appears in the majority opinion. (Derived from Slater v. Slater (n.d.).)