Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton

United States District Court for the District of Utah · Administrative Law

Administrative LawNEPAOil and Gas LeasingSupplemental Environmental ReviewAPA arbitrary and capricious reviewNEPA hard lookno-action alternativeno-leasing alternative

Facts

Utah BLM offered and later issued sixteen oil and gas leases on southern Utah public lands, and each lease authorized some level of surface disturbance. Four Richfield field office parcels were supported primarily by older planning documents, including the 1975 Price Environmental Analysis Record, the 1982 Henry Mountain Management Framework Plan, and a 1988 supplemental EA. For all sixteen parcels, BLM had newer information about wilderness characteristics: its 1998-1999 wilderness inventory found wilderness character in the Desolation Canyon, Floy Canyon, Flume Canyon, and Coal Canyon areas, and in 2002 BLM concluded that SUWA had provided new and significantly different information suggesting the Flat Tops parcels may have wilderness characteristics. Rather than preparing a new EA or EIS, BLM relied on Determinations of NEPA Adequacy and denied SUWA’s protest before issuing the leases.

Issue

Whether Utah BLM violated NEPA by issuing four Richfield leases without an adequate pre-leasing NEPA document that meaningfully considered the no-leasing alternative, and whether BLM also violated NEPA as to all sixteen leases by refusing to supplement its earlier NEPA analyses in light of significant new information about wilderness characteristics.

Rule

Under NEPA, before BLM issues oil and gas leases that authorize surface-disturbing activities, the agency must have an adequate pre-leasing EA or EIS supporting the leasing decision, including meaningful consideration of the no-action or no-leasing alternative in the land-use planning context. In addition, if major federal action remains and new information shows that the remaining action may affect the quality of the human environment in a significant manner or to a significant extent not already considered, the agency must prepare supplemental NEPA analysis; internal DNAs cannot substitute for that analysis.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

The Bureau of Land Stewardship plans to issue oil and gas leases on public land near Grand Junction, Colorado, and each lease would authorize some surface disturbance. The field office relies on a 1978 environmental analysis record tied to old management framework plans, a 1986 supplemental EA, and a recent determination of NEPA adequacy, but none of those materials gives full and meaningful consideration to a no-leasing alternative in the land-use planning context.

If a conservation group challenges the lease issuance under NEPA, what is the strongest argument?

Explanation. When lease issuance authorizes surface-disturbing activities, NEPA requires adequate pre-leasing support in an EA or EIS, including meaningful consideration of the no-action or no-leasing alternative. The majority held that reliance on old planning-era materials and a DNA was inadequate where the no-leasing alternative had not been fully and meaningfully considered. A DNA is only an internal adequacy check, not a substitute NEPA document.