Spaulding v. Morse

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts · Contracts

Contractscontract interpretationtrust agreementsupport obligationeducation paymentsmilitary servicespecific performancefuture payments

Facts

In 1937, the defendant and Ruth D. Morse entered into a trust agreement under which the defendant would pay $1,200 yearly in monthly installments for their son Richard until he entered college, and then $2,200 yearly for up to four years of higher education. The agreement stated that the payments were to be applied toward Richard's maintenance, education, and benefit so long as his mother maintained and educated him to the trustee's satisfaction. The defendant made the monthly payments until February 1, 1946. Richard finished high school on February 5, 1946, entered the United States Army the next day, remained continuously in service, and had not entered any college or other higher institution of learning.

Issue

Whether the defendant was excused from making payments under the trust agreement while Richard was in the armed services of the United States. Also, whether the trial judge could order future payments that were not yet due and depended on future contingencies.

Rule

A written instrument must be interpreted in light of the material circumstances known to the parties and so as to effectuate the main purpose manifested by the instrument as a whole; an omitted intention cannot be supplied by conjecture, though an implication may be drawn if the whole instrument sufficiently declares the desired result. Under such a support-and-education agreement, where the beneficiary is in military service, maintained by the government, not in the mother's actual custody, and not pursuing higher education, the obligor is not required to make payments for maintenance and education during that period. In a bill treated as one for specific performance, a court may not order payments not yet due and dependent on future contingencies.

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In Seattle, Nina Calder and Owen Calder signed a post-divorce trust agreement requiring Owen to pay $900 per month to a trustee for their son Leo's "maintenance, education, and benefit" until Leo entered a college or other higher institution, after which Owen would pay a higher annual amount for up to four years of higher education. Two weeks after finishing high school, Leo enlisted in the Coast Guard, lived on base, received food and housing from the government, and did not enroll in any college program.

Is Owen required to continue the $900 monthly payments while Leo remains on active duty under these circumstances?

Explanation. A written instrument is construed in light of the parties' circumstances and the instrument's main purpose. Where the agreement is aimed at the child's maintenance and education, and the child is in military service, maintained by the government, not in the mother's actual custody, and not attending the contemplated higher education, the obligor is not required to pay during that period. This result depends on interpretation of the instrument's purpose, not on a general impossibility doctrine. (Derived from Spaulding v. Morse (n.d.).)