Splawn v. Splawn

South Carolina Supreme Court · Family Law

Family LawEquitable DistributionBigamous MarriageFamily Court Jurisdictionsubject-matter jurisdictionequitable distributionbigamyvoid ab initio

Facts

Nathaniel and Louvenia Splawn went through a marriage ceremony in April 1961, but neither knew that Husband had never obtained a final divorce from a 1955 marriage. They lived as husband and wife until separating in 1990, when Wife filed for divorce; although divorce was denied for failure of proof, Family Court equitably distributed their property 60% to Wife and 40% to Husband. Husband later filed for divorce based on one year's continuous separation and sought enforcement of the prior equitable distribution order. Wife then alleged she had recently discovered Husband's prior undissolved marriage and argued the marriage was void and Family Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to distribute the property.

Issue

Does Family Court have subject-matter jurisdiction to equitably distribute property when the parties' marriage is void because one spouse was already married to another person at the time of the purported marriage? More specifically, does the void nature of a bigamous marriage prevent Family Court from ordering equitable distribution?

Rule

Family Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider and order equitable distribution of property in a bigamous marriage that is void ab initio. There is no legal distinction between a marriage annulled and one terminated by reason of bigamy, and in making equitable distribution the court may consider knowing bigamy as misconduct, fault, or another relevant factor.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Columbia, South Carolina, Dana Mercer and Eli Rowan went through a marriage ceremony in 1998 and acquired a house, retirement accounts, and vehicles over the next twenty years. After they separated, Dana discovered Eli's earlier marriage in Georgia had never been dissolved because no final decree was entered.

If Dana argues the family court cannot divide the parties' property because the later marriage was void from the beginning, how should the court rule?

Explanation. The governing rule is that family court has subject-matter jurisdiction to equitably distribute property even when the marriage is void ab initio because of bigamy. The majority reasoned there is no legal distinction, for jurisdictional purposes, between an annulled marriage and one terminated by reason of bigamy, so the void nature of the marriage does not defeat equitable-distribution jurisdiction. (Derived from Splawn v. Splawn (n.d.).)