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Sporn v. MCA Records

New York Court of Appeals · 1983 · Torts
58 N.Y.2d 482
Updated
tortsstatute of limitationsconversiontrespass to propertyCPLR 214CPLR 203continuing trespassaccrual

Facts

Williams claimed he produced the master recording of "Get a Job" in 1957 and leased all rights in it to Ember Records, allegedly with an oral agreement that the master would be returned to him if Ember left the record business. When Ember liquidated in 1965, it sold its master recording catalogue, including "Get a Job," to Bell Records instead of returning the master to Williams. Bell and its successor continued to release the song, and MCA later sold recordings containing the song under an agreement with Arista. In 1976 Williams assigned his claimed rights to Sporn, who sued for unauthorized exploitation of the master recording.

Issue

When a defendant allegedly uses a plaintiff's master recording as its own, does the cause of action accrue once at the initial wrongful taking or anew with each subsequent commercial use? More specifically, is such conduct a continuing trespass or a conversion for Statute of Limitations purposes?

Rule

For Statute of Limitations purposes, a claim accrues when the cause of action accrues. If the pleaded conduct amounts merely to interference with property, the action may be trespass, and a continuing trespass may give rise to successive causes of action for interferences within the limitations period. But if the pleaded conduct amounts to a taking, destruction, or assertion of dominion over the property as one's own, the action is conversion, and the limitations period runs from the time of conversion.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In 2017, Lena Ortiz claimed that a film archive in Chicago was obligated to return her original 16-mm documentary reel when a licensing arrangement ended. Instead, the archive kept the reel, listed it in its catalog as archive property, and licensed screenings of copies made from that reel through 2023. Lena sued in 2024, arguing each screening created a fresh claim.

How should a court most likely characterize Lena's claim for Statute of Limitations purposes?

Explanation. The majority opinion directs courts to examine what the plaintiff says the defendant did. Keeping the tangible reel, cataloging it as the archive's property, and exploiting it as its own is more than mere interference; it is a denial of plaintiff's rights and a total usurpation of possession, which is conversion. For conversion, the limitations period runs from the initial conversion, not from each later use.