State v. Guminga
Facts
During an undercover operation, two investigators entered Lindee's Restaurant with a 17-year-old woman, and all three ordered alcoholic beverages. The waitress did not ask the minor's age or request identification, returned with the drinks, and the minor paid for them; officers then arrested the waitress for serving liquor to a minor in violation of Minn. Stat. § 340.73. The restaurant owner, George Joseph Guminga, was charged under Minn. Stat. § 340.941, which makes an employer vicariously criminally liable for an employee's unlawful liquor sale. The state did not contend that Guminga knew of or ratified the waitress's actions.
Issue
Does Minn. Stat. § 340.941, which imposes vicarious criminal liability on an employer for an employee's sale of liquor to a minor, violate due process on its face? More specifically, may Minnesota impose criminal punishment for an act the defendant did not commit, know of, or consent to?
Rule
Under the Minnesota Constitution's due process clause, the state may not convict a person of a crime punishable by imprisonment for an act the person did not commit, did not have knowledge of, and did not expressly or impliedly consent to. Vicarious liability in this context may constitutionally support only civil penalties, not criminal penalties carrying the legal and social consequences of a criminal conviction.
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If the state offers no evidence that Nora knew of, committed, or consented to the sale, which is the strongest argument under the controlling doctrine?