Swaby v. Northern Hills Regional Railroad Authority

Supreme Court of South Dakota · 2009 · Property

Propertyrailroad right of way1875 Actabandonmentquiet titlecondition subsequentfee simple determinablepossibility of reverter

Facts

In 1890, several landowners conveyed strips of land to Fremont, Elkhorn and Missouri Valley Railroad Company, and FEMV also acquired certain right-of-way interests under the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875. FEMV's successor, Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, obtained ICC authorization to abandon the line in 1970, removed the tracks and facilities, ceased railroad service, and later quitclaimed its interest to the State, from which interests eventually passed to NHRRA. The plaintiffs are successors in interest to the original landowners and claimed title based on abandonment and reversion. The disputed property included land acquired under the 1875 Act, 1890 deeds with reversionary language, 1890 deeds without reversionary language, and parcels later conveyed to plaintiffs by deeds that excluded the railroad right of way.

Issue

Whether the railroad's 1970 actions legally abandoned or otherwise terminated its interests in the disputed right of way, and how the various 1890 deeds and the 1875 Act should be construed to determine who holds title after abandonment or breach. Also, whether plaintiffs whose own deeds excluded the right-of-way land established sufficient title to maintain a quiet title action as to those excluded parcels.

Rule

For 1875 Act rights of way, where the United States later issued land patents without reserving an interest in the right of way, sections 912 and 913 do not apply, and a railroad right of way may be abandoned. Railroad abandonment requires intent to abandon plus actual relinquishment; ICC authorization alone is indicative but not conclusive, while filing for abandonment, expressing no intent to resume rail use, removing tracks and facilities, and selling the corridor for non-rail use together establish abandonment. In construing deeds, a conveyance with reversionary language but without limiting language creates a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, while a deed that also limits the conveyance to railroad purposes and provides for reversion creates a fee simple determinable; deeds granting only a 'Right of Way' through, over, and across land with uncertain strip description may convey only an easement.

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In Wyoming, Prairie Summit Rail obtained a right of way under a federal railroad statute, and years later the United States issued patents to homesteaders that mentioned the rail corridor but reserved no federal reversionary interest. In 1998, the railroad obtained federal abandonment authorization, removed all track and ties, stopped service permanently, and sold the corridor to Red Butte County for a public greenway.

If the successors to the homesteaders sue to quiet title, who has the better argument regarding whether the railroad right of way was abandoned?

Explanation. The majority rule requires both intent to abandon and actual relinquishment. Intent may be inferred from seeking abandonment authority and expressing no plan to resume rail use; actual relinquishment is shown by removing tracks and facilities and selling the corridor for non-rail use. Where later land patents did not reserve a federal reversionary interest, the federal government retained nothing relevant here, so the successors to the original patentees have the stronger claim after abandonment. (Derived from Swaby v. Northern Hills Regional Railroad Authority (2009).)