Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Company
Facts
Standard came to completely control Deep Rock through ownership of its common stock and domination of its board, officers, and fiscal affairs. Deep Rock was inadequately capitalized and heavily indebted from the outset, and Standard managed it in a way that maintained a stranglehold over it, including charging interest and management fees, causing dividend payments despite weak finances, and placing valuable properties in a Standard-controlled affiliate and leasing them back to Deep Rock on burdensome terms. When Deep Rock entered receivership and then § 77B proceedings, Standard filed a creditor claim exceeding $9 million based on an open account, which the trustee and intervening preferred stockholders attacked as involving fraudulent and improper transactions. Before the master reported on the claim, Standard proposed a compromise for $5 million, and the approved amended plan gave noteholders debentures and cash, while allocating about 73% of the new common stock to Standard, 19% to old preferred stockholders, and 8% to noteholders.
Issue
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in approving the compromise of Standard's claim and the reorganization plan where Standard had completely dominated and mismanaged Deep Rock and the plan gave Standard a controlling share of the equity in the new company? More specifically, could a court of equity approve a § 77B plan that failed to give preferred stockholders priority over Standard in the remaining equity and at least equal voice in management?
Rule
Under § 77B, a court approving a reorganization plan acts as a court of equity and is authorized and required to recognize the rights and status of preferred stockholders arising from a controlling stockholder's wrongful and injurious conduct in mismanaging the debtor's affairs. The doctrine of corporate entity will not be regarded when adherence to it would work fraud or injustice, and no plan should be approved that does not give injured preferred stockholders participation in the equity prior to the controlling parent and at least equal voice with it in management where equity remains after satisfaction of creditors.
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Should the court approve the plan over the preferred stockholders’ objection?