Touby v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States · 1991 · Administrative Law
Administrative LawNondelegationControlled Substances ActSubdelegationimminent hazard to the public safetytemporary schedulingAttorney GeneralDEA

Facts

The Controlled Substances Act generally requires scientific review, consideration of statutory factors, and APA procedures before a substance is permanently scheduled. In 1984, Congress added § 201(h), which lets the Attorney General temporarily schedule a substance when doing so is necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety, using expedited procedures and for a limited duration. The Attorney General delegated his powers under the Act, including temporary scheduling authority, to the DEA, and the DEA Administrator temporarily placed 4-methylaminorex, known as Euphoria, in schedule I. While that temporary order was in effect, agents found a fully operational drug laboratory in the Toubys' home, and petitioners were charged and convicted of manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture Euphoria.

Issue

Whether 21 U.S.C. § 811(h), which authorizes temporary scheduling of controlled substances, unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Attorney General, and whether the Attorney General was statutorily authorized to delegate that temporary scheduling authority to the DEA.

Rule

Congress may delegate authority if it lays down an intelligible principle to guide the delegate, and § 811(h) is constitutional because it imposes multiple specific restrictions on the Attorney General's discretion, including the imminent-hazard finding, required consideration of statutory factors, notice obligations, and the schedule-specific findings required by § 812(b). Under 21 U.S.C. § 871(a), the Attorney General may delegate any function under the Controlled Substances Act to a Department of Justice officer or employee unless the statute specifically limits delegation elsewhere.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

  • The court's holding and reasoning
  • Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
  • 10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case
Sign up free to see more →
Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Congress enacts the Rapid Intoxicants Act, allowing the Attorney General to temporarily place any new psychoactive chemical on a prohibited list whenever the Attorney General believes regulation would be useful. The statute requires no finding of imminent danger, no consideration of abuse data or health risks, and no schedule-specific findings, but violations carry criminal penalties in Phoenix, Arizona and nationwide.

A defendant prosecuted under the temporary order argues that the statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. How should a court rule under the majority's reasoning?

Explanation. The majority upheld temporary scheduling because Congress imposed several concrete limits: a finding that action is necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to public safety, consideration of specified abuse and public-health factors, notice requirements, and mandatory schedule-specific findings. A statute allowing temporary criminalization whenever regulation seems useful, without those constraints, would not be supported by the same reasoning. (Derived from Touby v. United States (n.d.).)