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Trimarco v. Klein

New York Court of Appeals · 1982 · Torts
Tortsnegligencecustomindustry practiceglass shower doornegligencecustom and usageindustry practice

Facts

Plaintiff, a tenant in defendants' multiple dwelling, was injured when the bathtub's glass enclosure door shattered as he was sliding it open to leave the tub. The door was made of ordinary glass, though it looked no different from tempered safety glass, and plaintiff and his wife assumed it was safety glass; defendants never informed them otherwise. Plaintiff introduced expert testimony, safety and governmental bulletins, and admissions from defendants' managing agent showing that since at least the early 1950s shatterproof materials had come into common use for bathroom enclosures and that since at least 1965 landlords customarily used safety glass or similar material when installing or replacing shower-enclosure glass. The trial court also admitted later-enacted General Business Law provisions requiring safety glazing in bathroom enclosures, while instructing the jury that those statutes did not directly apply to this preexisting installation.

Issue

Whether plaintiff's proof of custom and usage was sufficient to establish a prima facie negligence case against the landlords for maintaining an ordinary-glass shower door, even absent prior notice from plaintiff or a similar accident in the building. Also, whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider General Business Law provisions requiring safety glazing for post-effective-date installations.

Rule

Proof of a fairly well defined custom or usage in the same business is admissible to show whether a defendant fell below the standard of reasonable care, because it informs what is reasonable conduct under the circumstances and may charge the actor with knowledge of the practice or negligent ignorance of it. Such proof need not show universal compliance, and it is neither conclusive nor controlling; the ultimate question remains whether the conduct was reasonable. A statute protecting only a class not including the plaintiff should not be submitted to the jury as a standard of defendants' conduct when other competent proof exists on the relevant custom.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Buffalo, Lena Ortiz rented an apartment from North Harbor Residential. While stepping out of her kitchen, she pushed on a large interior glass swing door provided by the landlord, and the pane shattered, badly cutting her arm. At trial, Lena offers an engineer's testimony, local property-manager admissions, and trade publications showing that for many years apartment owners in western New York commonly used laminated or tempered glass when installing or replacing similar interior doors in tenant areas because ordinary glass posed a known laceration risk.

North Harbor moves to dismiss, arguing Lena failed to prove negligence because she showed no building-code violation and no prior similar accident in the complex. How should the court rule?

Explanation. A fairly well defined custom or usage in the same business is admissible because it bears on reasonable care. If the plaintiff shows the custom, the defendant's departure from it, and proximate cause, that evidence is sufficient to reach the jury even without proof of a code violation, tenant notice, or prior similar accidents in the building. The custom need not be universal; it is evidence of reasonableness, not a conclusive rule.