United States v. Biaggi

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 1990 · Evidence

909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990)

Updated August 22, 2026

Evidenceconsciousness of innocenceimmunity negotiationsRule 401Rule 403extortion under color of official rightcampaign contributionsbribery

Facts

Wedtech paid money, stock, and other benefits to public officials and lawyers connected to them while seeking government contracts and approvals. One issue on appeal concerned defendant Mariotta, who claimed he lacked knowledge of bribery and other wrongdoing by other Wedtech officials and sought to introduce evidence that he denied such knowledge when the Government offered him immunity in exchange for truthful information about others. The district court excluded that evidence, while the Government introduced evidence said to show Mariotta's consciousness of guilt. Other issues included whether a $50,000 payment to a law firm connected to Congressman Biaggi could be treated as both a legal fee and an unlawful bribe or extortion payment, and whether campaign-contribution principles altered the extortion analysis for elected officials.

Issue

Whether the district court erred in excluding evidence that Mariotta failed to obtain immunity because he denied knowledge of wrongdoing by others, as proof of consciousness of innocence. Also, whether dual-purpose payments may constitute bribery or extortion when partly for lawful services and partly for official influence, and whether an inference of inducement from repeated benefits applies to elected officials who may lawfully receive campaign contributions.

Rule

A defendant's response to an immunity offer may be relevant evidence of consciousness of innocence when the defendant denied knowledge of others' wrongdoing at a time when admitting such knowledge would have secured immunity; exclusion of such evidence may deny a fair trial if it is highly probative and central to the defense. A payment may constitute bribery and extortion even if it also has a lawful purpose, so long as the evidence permits the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the unlawful purpose was substantial rather than merely a vague possibility attending an otherwise legitimate transaction. The inference of inducement from repeated acceptance of substantial benefits does not apply to elected officials in the same way as to appointed officials, because elected officials may lawfully receive campaign contributions and juries must be instructed to distinguish lawful contributions from unlawful extortion or bribes.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a federal fraud prosecution in Chicago, the government argues that Devon Pike knew his company's executives were paying kickbacks. Before indictment, prosecutors told Devon they would seek immunity for him if he truthfully disclosed what he knew about other participants, and Devon responded that he knew of no kickbacks by anyone.

If Devon offers that exchange at trial to show lack of guilty knowledge, how should the court rule?

Explanation. The majority held that a defendant's response to an immunity offer can be relevant when the defendant denied knowledge of others' wrongdoing at a time when admitting such knowledge would have secured immunity. That denial has probative force beyond a mere not-guilty plea because most people would seize a genuine chance to avoid prosecution by inculpating others. The opinion specifically distinguished this from ordinary plea bargaining and treated the evidence as admissible, subject to Rule 403.