United States v. Cooper

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2014 · Evidence

767 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2014)

Updated August 22, 2026

EvidenceConspiracyDrug quantitySentencing enhancementsPrior inconsistent statementsRule 801(d)(1)(A)grand jury testimonyprior inconsistent statement

Facts

Trial evidence showed that McDowell, Cooper, Harris, and Presley used Donia McDowell's Longwood apartment to mix, package, and sell heroin, and that McDowell financed heroin purchases from Chicago while others sold the drugs. Donia and Johnson minimized their knowledge at trial, but the government introduced redacted grand jury testimony in which Donia described the group's coordinated heroin operation and McDowell's financing role. Other witnesses described Cooper and Presley packaging and selling heroin, McDowell's ability to direct or correct transactions, and the use of apartments and cars tied to McDowell in the operation. At sentencing, the district court rejected the government's higher quantity estimate but found both defendants responsible for more than one but less than three kilograms of heroin, and it enhanced McDowell's sentence for co-conspirator firearm possession and for leading a criminal activity involving at least five participants.

Issue

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Cooper's and McDowell's convictions for participating in a heroin distribution conspiracy, whether the district court clearly erred in attributing more than one but less than three kilograms of heroin to them, and whether the district court properly enhanced McDowell's sentence for co-conspirator firearm possession and for being a leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants. The opinion also addresses whether Donia's grand jury testimony was properly admitted as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).

Rule

To prove a drug-distribution conspiracy, the government must show that two or more people agreed to commit an unlawful act and that the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined the agreement; the agreement may be inferred from the parties' relationships and conduct, including whether they embraced the criminal objective, maintained cooperative relationships, and had some appreciable ability to guide the destiny of the drugs. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), a witness's prior inconsistent statement given under oath, including grand jury testimony, is admissible for its truth when the witness testifies and is subject to cross-examination, and claimed memory loss can qualify as inconsistency. For sentencing, drug quantity need only be proved by a preponderance of reliable evidence, a court may estimate quantity from reliable evidence about size, frequency, and duration of sales, co-conspirator firearm possession supports a weapon enhancement if reasonably foreseeable, and a § 3B1.1(a) enhancement applies when the defendant was an organizer or leader of criminal activity involving five or more participants and exercised real and direct influence over at least one participant.

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

At a federal drug trial in Milwaukee, Tara Benson takes the stand and says she remembers appearing before the grand jury but cannot remember stating that Nolan Price and two others packaged fentanyl in her garage. The prosecutor offers the transcript of her sworn grand jury testimony, and defense counsel cross-examines Tara about her claimed memory loss and the circumstances of the earlier testimony.

Is the grand jury testimony admissible for its truth?

Explanation. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) allows admission of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence when it was given under oath, the declarant testifies at trial, and is subject to cross-examination. Under the majority opinion, professed memory loss may qualify as inconsistency, and claimed amnesia does not by itself make the witness unavailable for cross-examination.