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United States v. Cronic

Supreme Court of the United States · 1984 · Criminal Procedure

Criminal ProcedureSixth AmendmentEffective Assistance of CounselSixth Amendmenteffective assistance of counselpresumed prejudiceadversarial testingdenial of counsel

Facts

Respondent was indicted with two associates for a mail fraud check-kiting scheme involving over $9.4 million in checks transferred between banks in Tampa, Florida, and Norman, Oklahoma. Shortly before trial, respondent's retained lawyer withdrew, and the District Court appointed a young lawyer whose principal practice was real estate and gave him 25 days to prepare, although the Government had investigated for more than four and one-half years and reviewed thousands of documents. The two codefendants agreed to testify for the Government, respondent did not testify after the court ruled a prior conviction could be used to impeach him, and defense counsel put on no affirmative defense but cross-examined Government witnesses. Respondent was convicted on 11 of 13 counts and sentenced to 25 years.

Issue

Whether the Sixth Amendment permits a court to presume ineffective assistance of counsel from circumstances such as limited preparation time, counsel's inexperience, the gravity of the charge, the complexity of possible defenses, and witness accessibility, without identifying specific attorney errors or an actual breakdown in the adversarial process.

Rule

The Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel because it protects the fairness and reliability of the adversarial process. Prejudice may be presumed only in limited circumstances, such as when counsel is completely denied at a critical stage, when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, or when surrounding circumstances make it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that the trial is inherently unfair. Otherwise, a defendant must point to specific errors by counsel; the mere presence of difficult circumstances does not by itself justify a presumption of ineffectiveness.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Phoenix, Daniel Mercer was charged with operating a fraudulent invoice scheme. Twelve days before trial, the court appointed Lena Ortiz, a newly licensed lawyer whose prior work was mostly landlord-tenant matters; she received the prosecution's organized exhibit binders and, at trial, cross-examined witnesses and argued that Daniel lacked fraudulent intent.

If Daniel appeals claiming the Sixth Amendment was violated solely because of the short preparation period, counsel's inexperience, and the seriousness of the charges, what is the strongest answer?

Explanation. The governing rule is that prejudice is presumed only in limited situations: complete denial of counsel at a critical stage, counsel's entire failure to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, or surrounding circumstances so extreme that no lawyer could likely provide effective assistance. Short preparation time, counsel's youth or inexperience, and the gravity of the charge are relevant to evaluating actual performance, but they do not by themselves justify a presumption of ineffectiveness. Because counsel acted as an advocate by cross-examining witnesses and contesting intent, Daniel would need to identify specific errors rather than rely on circumstances alone. (Derived from United States v. Cronic (1984).)