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United States v. Delgado

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2025 · Criminal Procedure

Criminal ProcedureSecond AmendmentSentencing GuidelinesCrime of Violence18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)Second AmendmentBruenfelon-in-possession

Facts

After a traffic stop, police impounded Delgado’s car and found a loaded ghost gun and a spare magazine containing about 29 rounds of ammunition; Delgado admitted the gun and ammunition were his. Delgado had a prior Florida felony conviction for attempted second-degree murder under Fla. Stat. §§ 782.04(2) and 777.04(1). He pleaded guilty to violating § 922(g)(1), then argued that the statute was unconstitutional and that his Florida conviction should not count as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The district court rejected both arguments and sentenced him based on a base offense level of 20.

Issue

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment after Bruen, and whether Florida attempted second-degree murder categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).

Rule

In the Second Circuit, § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional after Bruen under binding circuit precedent. For Guidelines purposes, a prior offense is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(1) if, under the categorical approach, its minimum elements require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; Florida attempted second-degree murder satisfies that standard because it requires an intentional act that would have resulted in death and that is imminently dangerous to another and demonstrates a depraved mind without regard for human life.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In the Southern District of New York, Omar Velez pleads guilty to possessing ammunition after a prior felony conviction. On appeal, he argues that the federal felon-in-possession statute is facially unconstitutional after Bruen, but he does not distinguish controlling Second Circuit precedent upholding the statute.

How should the court rule on Omar's facial constitutional challenge?

Explanation. The challenge should fail. The majority opinion states that, in the Second Circuit, prior circuit precedent upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) remains binding after Bruen, as reaffirmed by later circuit authority. A defendant cannot obtain relief on a facial challenge merely by invoking Bruen while ignoring controlling precedent. (Derived from United States v. Delgado (n.d.).)