United States v. Duenas

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2012 · Evidence

691 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2012)

Updated August 22, 2026

Evidenceformer testimonyRule 804(b)(1)similar motivesuppression hearingcross-examinationmedia ride-alongFourth Amendment

Facts

Guam police, assisted by federal agents, executed a narcotics search warrant at the Duenases' compound in a chaotic two-day search during which members of the media and members of the public were allowed onto parts of the property and photographed or viewed seized items. Officers found 74 grams of methamphetamine in an unlocked safe in Ray and Lou's shared bedroom, along with smaller amounts of methamphetamine, guns, drug paraphernalia, and drug ledgers; thousands of stolen items were also seized. Ray and Lou were arrested and gave statements, with Ray's statements taken by Officer Frankie Smith and Lou admitting that she and Ray exchanged methamphetamine and cash for stolen merchandise. After Smith died before trial, the district court allowed portions of his suppression-hearing testimony to be read to the jury as former testimony.

Issue

Whether physical evidence seized during a search should be suppressed when police allow media onto the property during execution of the warrant, even though the media did not discover, handle, or develop the admitted evidence. Whether Officer Smith's suppression-hearing testimony was admissible at trial under Rule 804(b)(1) after his death, based on Ray's prior opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine him. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Lou's convictions for possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine.

Rule

A Fourth Amendment violation from police allowing media presence during execution of a warrant does not automatically require suppression; the exclusionary rule does not apply where the police stay within the warrant's scope and the media do not discover, develop, assist with, or taint the evidence later admitted. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), former testimony is admissible only if the opposing party had an opportunity and a similar motive to develop the testimony in the earlier proceeding, and similar motive requires comparison of the party's fundamental objectives, the underlying issues, and the context of the questioning. Constructive possession may be shown by dominion and control over drugs, including through joint venture authority, but mere proximity or joint occupancy alone is insufficient without evidence tying the defendant to the contraband.

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Phoenix, prosecutors charged Nolan Price with armed robbery. At a pretrial suppression hearing, Nolan cross-examined Detective Mara Solis only about whether his stationhouse statement was obtained after he requested counsel and whether the detectives threatened him; defense counsel objected when the prosecutor began asking about the statement’s details as irrelevant to admissibility. Before trial, Solis died, and the prosecution sought to read her suppression-hearing testimony to the jury to prove what Nolan admitted.

Should the court admit the detective’s prior testimony under Rule 804(b)(1)?

Explanation. Rule 804(b)(1) requires not just opportunity but a similar motive to develop the testimony. The inquiry compares the party’s fundamental objectives, underlying issues, and the context of questioning. Here, Nolan’s objective at the suppression hearing was to show a Miranda or voluntariness defect, while at trial his objective would be to attack the substance, accuracy, and completeness of the alleged confession. That is not a similar motive, so the testimony should be excluded. (Derived from United States v. Duenas (2012).)